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INTRODUCTION
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure set mechanical requirements, rather than
general guidelines, to determine whether a plaintiff can access the system of federal
courts. Because the rules are automatic and familiar, they free up the court’s mental
resources for proper attention to specific facts, for clashes between important values,
and for the application of substantive law to unwieldy real-life situations. Thanks to
the Rules, a clerk can safely “cut and paste” from any previous case the judge’s
ground rules for analysis of the pending motion. The values of this system—
predictability, efficiency, and the kinds of fairness that go with them—are threatened
when standards of applying the Rules change, as they did after the watershed 2009
ruling in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.1 When such a change happens, the strength of a
mechanistic, rules-based system can become its weakness.
In 2007 and 2009, the Supreme Court altered the governing interpretation of the
Federal Rules’ pleading standards under Rule 8(a)(2).2 In Bell Atlantic v. Twombly
and in Iqbal, it authorized federal district courts to act more readily to shield
defendants from the ordeal of the discovery process. The cases set a higher
threshold for a plaintiff to withstand a so-called Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
Under the new standard, courts should dismiss factually sketchy complaints when
alternative explanations make liability implausible.3 Courts are encouraged to ignore
“threadbare recitations” of the elements of a claim, and to set aside “conclusory”
assertions unlinked to factual allegations.4 The associated interpretation of Rule
8(a)(2) takes seriously the requirement that the complaint’s “short and plain
statement” truly “show” how the plaintiff is entitled to relief.5

1

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).

2

Id. at 678-79; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007).

3

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

4

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

5

FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
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In summer 2009, in response to Iqbal, every federal court redrafted its boilerplate
presumptions about facts in 12(b)(6) dismissal rulings. The Court intended this
result, but there have also been ripple effects6 it did not foresee. In particular, it did
not anticipate that the interpretive change to Rule 8(a)(2) would also change Rule
8(a)(1).
In any written order of operations—including a judge’s procedure for analyzing
pleadings—a change in one place can cause unexpected problems elsewhere. It may
mean that other instructions need adjusting merely in order to maintain their
previous significance. What if the old rule was cross-referenced elsewhere, in a
different set of boilerplate instructions for judicial decision-making?7 How much
thought should a court put into the ongoing validity of that cross-reference—
especially when a primary purpose of the Rules is to reduce the need for abstract
procedural thinking?
This Note describes a little-observed8 ripple effect of the new pleading standard
announced in Iqbal, the antiterrorism case whose holding swept broadly and changed
the ground rules for considering allegations in so-called 12(b)(6) motions for all civil
cases.9 The 12(b)(6) motion allows the defendant to seek dismissal because the
document initiating the case—the complaint—fails to allege the elements required
by the statute it is trying to invoke. Over the decades before Iqbal, many federal
courts had come to use part of the procedure for evaluating a 12(b)(6) motion in the
context of an entirely different kind of ruling. Courts were always (before Iqbal)
justified in deploying the 12(b)(6) factual standard for reading complaints in a
different scenario: a so-called facial 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction.10 Even though the former situation involved Rule 8(a)(2) and the
6
See Animal Sci. Prods. v. China Nat’l Metals & Minerals Imp. & Exp. Corp., 702 F.
Supp. 2d 320, 334 (D.N.J. 2010) (“it appears logical for the Supreme Court’s guidance in
Iqbal to have at least a ripple effect on the standard [for subject-matter jurisdiction]”),
discussed infra at notes 174-78 and accompanying text; Haley Paint Co. v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 775 F. Supp. 2d 790, 798-99 (D. Md. 2011) (it is “logical” to “appl[y] the
pleading standards [of Iqbal] to the jurisdictional allegations in the complaint as opposed to
the factual allegations”), discussed infra at note 179-80, note 216 and accompanying text.
This Note argues that district courts are wrong to make these “apparently logical”
extrapolations from Iqbal to the jurisdictional context. See infra Part IV.
7

See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002) (“Other provisions of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are inextricably linked to Rule 8(a)’s simplified notice
pleading standard.”).
8
But see Jordan Shepherd, When Sosa Meets Iqbal: Plausibility Pleading in Human
Rights Litigation, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2318, 2318-51 (2011) (examining effects of the new
standard on 12(b)(1) subject-matter jurisdiction rulings in international human-rights litigation
under the Alien Torts Statute (ATS), and contending that “plausibility does not and need not
have a huge impact in ATS litigation”).
9

See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring a plaintiff’s complaint to
include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”
(emphasis added)).
10
See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) (motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction);
see also FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1) (requiring a plaintiff’s complaint to include “a short and plain
statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction”).
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latter involved Rule 8(a)(1), the difference did not matter: the same generous
treatment of facts applied to both. Under Iqbal, that is no longer true.
Because of the longstanding cross-reference, when the Supreme Court changed
the 12(b)(6) standard, it unwittingly changed the approach many district courts
would take in 12(b)(1) motions as well. There is ample reason to believe the Court
did this unwittingly, and will move to correct district courts that maintain the
outdated cross-reference.11
Although it solved one procedural problem by requiring plausibility in the
complaint, the Iqbal Court created new problems in another area of the law. These
difficulties are in an unrelated area of doctrine (subject-matter jurisdiction), and are
of an entirely different order than the ones Twombly and Iqbal sought to address.
Unwittingly, in taking the keys to discovery away from speculative plaintiffs,12 the
Court gave permission for federal judges to borrow the keys to a new vehicle:
heightened plausibility standards for subject-matter jurisdiction. Emerging as a
result is a new kind of “drive-by jurisdictional ruling”13 of the kind the Court has
often sought to end.
This Note examines the interplay between the Twombly/Iqbal doctrine and
federal courts’ practical approach to subject-matter jurisdiction. Part II describes the
background jurisprudence on subject-matter jurisdiction, including the sharp line the
Supreme Court has consistently re-drawn between claims lacking merit and those
lacking jurisdictional basis, from Bell v. Hood through Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. The
consistent theme of this jurisprudence is that courts should not conflate merits and
jurisdictional questions, and that judges should readily activate the court’s
jurisdiction in response to a simple allegation in the complaint. Part III then
describes the recent change to pleading standards on the merits of a claim. It
explains the origins, factual context, and doctrinal bases of the altered pleading
standard introduced in Iqbal and Twombly. These rationales do not, in most cases,
apply to motions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
In Part IV, lower-court case law reveals that since 2009, in practice, the Iqbal
standard has been interfering with the agenda of Arbaugh, in a way that the Supreme
Court did not intend. Federal judges, in their eagerness to apply the novel pleading
standard of Iqbal, have neglected the jurisdictional teachings of the Supreme Court
11

In the terminology of computer programming, the Iqbal Court altered a subroutine
(“factual pleading standard”) without considering all the contexts in which that subroutine is
triggered. The debugging approach called a “stack trace” operates partly by flagging such
troublesome cross-references when code is altered. See DORIAN ARNOLD ET AL., INT’L
PARALLEL & DISTRIB. PROCESSING SYMPOSIUM, STACK TRACE ANALYSIS FOR LARGE SCALE
DEBUGGING
(Mar.
2007),
available
at
ftp://ftp.cs.wisc.edu/paradyn/papers/
Arnold06STAT.pdf (recommending a debugging approach that distinguishes the contexts in
which subroutines are invoked because “functions invoked via different call paths . . . may
demonstrate different application semantics to the user that would not be visible without this
distinction”). Such a tool would have indicated to the Court that 12(b)(1) “algorithms” often
invoke the “factual pleading standard” subroutine, and hence that changes to that subroutine
could alter 12(b)(1) outputs as well as 12(b)(6) outputs. The Court did not anticipate this
result, so its instructions for applying the Federal Rules need debugging after the fact.
12

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (“Rule 8 . . . does not unlock the doors of
discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions”).
13

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998).
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in the Arbaugh line of cases. As a result, since Iqbal an erroneous 12(b)(1) standard
has propagated rapidly through circuit and lower courts.
If the application of Iqbal to jurisdictional pleadings is an error, as this Note
maintains and as recent Supreme Court reaffirmations of Arbaugh suggest, it may
prove difficult to eradicate. Part V addresses the ineffectiveness of circuit courts and
the rules-based system in correcting such mistakes. Indeed, in recent years, the
Supreme Court continued to reaffirm (as it has for two decades) the importance of
accepting subject-matter jurisdiction14—even while the rest of the federal system
increasingly deployed Iqbal to make it more difficult to invoke the power of the
courts.
The leakage of Iqbal plausibility requirements into rulings on subject-matter
jurisdiction exemplifies the problem of unintended consequences in civil-procedure
jurisprudence. Since 2009, federal courts have faced a doctrinal dilemma. The
teaching of Twombly and Iqbal is that cases should be more readily dismissed before
discovery for failure to state a claim.15 And yet, for at least fifteen years, the
Supreme Court has consistently urged lower courts to grant fewer dismissals before
discovery for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.16 These two mandates push in
opposite directions, and reconciling them requires judges to master the elusive
distinction between a complaint’s legal sufficiency and its jurisdictional basis.
Without guidance from the Supreme Court in a case squarely presenting the question
of Iqbal and subject-matter jurisdiction, the error is likely to persist.
I. GETTING INTO COURT: FROM BELL AND CONLEY TO ARBAUGH
The pre-Iqbal pleading standards for both 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) motions can be
traced to the same case, Conley v. Gibson.17 That case underscored the remarkable
leniency the Rules mandated in reading the complaint: a plaintiff simply needed to
allege the factual presence of each of the elements of the cause of action.18 The court
would then assume all the alleged facts were true.19 Such pure credulity was
14
See Union Pac. R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 130 S. Ct. 584, 590 (2009),
discussed infra Part V.
15
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (complaint is inadequate, and case should be dismissed, “where
the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct”).
16
Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89 (jurisdictional dismissal is “proper only when the [federal]
claim is so insubstantial . . . as not to involve a federal controversy”) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted).
17

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).

18

See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) (“The liberal notice
pleading of Rule 8(a) is the starting point of a simplified pleading system, which was adopted
to focus litigation on the merits of a claim.”) (citing Conley, 355 U.S. at 48); see also Pressed
Steel Car Co. v. Union Pac. R. Co., 241 F. 964, 966 (D.N.Y. 1917) (Hand, J.) (earlier in the
trend toward more lenient pleading standards, noting that under the “new rules,” “the
pleadings shall contain no evidence, but the ‘ultimate facts’”).
19

See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) (dismissal should not be granted
even if “[i]t may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and
unlikely. . . . [T]he allegations of the complaint should be construed favorably to the
pleader.”).
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required of judges at this phase under the premise that the complaint served only to
give the defendant notice as to what conduct was at issue.20 The court would be
entitled to activate its skepticism after discovery.
In Conley, lower courts had dismissed a discrimination lawsuit railway workers
had brought against their own union.21 In a now-famous formula reinstating the suit,
the Supreme Court described the “notice pleading” standard district courts were to
use henceforward in ruling on 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted: “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure
to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”22 Through 2008, the
case would be directly cited for this proposition 18,539 times.23
Notably, however, Conley itself was not decided by this reasoning. The Court
issued its famous “no set of facts” formula—explaining Rule 12(b)(6) and its
associated pleading guideline, Rule 8(a)(2)—as dictum.24 The actual holding in
Conley hinged on a jurisdictional question and a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(1). In the lower courts the case had been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, not
because the plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of action. The defendant union’s
winning argument below had been that a federal statute assigned railroad labor
disputes in the first instance to the National Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB),
and that therefore the federal courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the
conflict under Rule 8(a)(1).25 Reversal by the Supreme Court meant that federal
court was the right place for the conflict, since it was not a dispute between labor and
management, as NRAB cases were, but between a union and its own members.26
Conley, then, was a jurisdictional decision that became famous for defining the
requirements for pleadings on the merits. In this muddled double identity it is the
shared ancestor for two opposed, increasingly urgent, and often conflated strands of
legal doctrine that emerged in the Supreme Court over the last thirty years. One line
of precedents has to do with jurisdiction, a court’s power to decide a case; the second
has to do with proper invocation of a law, which establishes the court’s duty in
deciding a case. In the first line of precedents, following in the footsteps of Conley,
20

Conley, 355 U.S. at 48 (“The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game
of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome.”).
21

Id. at 44.

22

Id. at 46; see also id. at 47-48 (such leniency in evaluating the complaint “is made
possible by the liberal opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial procedures established
by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of both claim and defense and to define more
narrowly the disputed facts and issues”); cf. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556
(2007) (requiring “enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
evidence” to substantiate the claim).
23

Lexis “Restrict by Headnote” Search, Lexis Advance, advance.lexis.com (Search
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); then Shepardize by Headnote 3, restricting prior to
year 2009).
24

Alana C. Jochum, Pleading in Ohio After Bell Atlantic v. Twombly and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 495, 502 n.47 (2010).
25

Conley, 355 U.S. at 43-44.

26

Id. at 45.
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the Court urges lower courts to accept federal subject-matter jurisdiction, rather than
looking for reasons to abjure their power. This tradition culminated with Arbaugh v.
Y & H Corp., which held that legal shortcomings in a complaint should rarely be
regarded as destroying the court’s jurisdiction.27 In the second line of precedents,
however, the Supreme Court has sought to make federal courts stricter in evaluating
whether the plaintiff has adequately stated a claim. This doctrine culminated in the
rulings of Twombly and Iqbal, which led every federal district to revise its
boilerplate. Through these two strands of doctrine, the Supreme Court has
simultaneously, and laudably, advanced two distinct agendas: to broaden the power
of the federal judiciary, and to narrow its duty.
A. Lenient Standards for Jurisdiction Before Discovery
The operative reasoning in Conley explained why federal courts were the
appropriate places to decide the dispute between the railway workers and their own
union.28 Like all jurisdictional questions, this was primarily a question of law,
hinging on interpretation of a Congressional act—but like all jurisdictional
questions, it also depended on seeing the facts properly. The essence of the lower
court’s ruling had been that the plaintiffs were ignoring Congress’s requirements by
bringing a railway labor dispute to the federal courts.29 Since Congress had given
jurisdiction over railway labor disputes to a specially created body, the National
Railroad Adjustment Board, the lower courts dismissed the case before discovery.30
The Supreme Court, however, determined that Congress had not intended to strip
federal courts of jurisdiction for all disputes involving railway labor unions, only
those between unions and the railways themselves.31 From one perspective, the
Court’s decision was purely legal, since it interpreted the statute. From another
perspective, though, the decision required the Court to make a factual determination
that the dispute in Conley was truly intramural, and not merely a reframing of a
conflict between the plaintiffs and their employer.32
Such factual determinations are delicate matters when presented as threshold
questions, before a case is properly underway. In Conley, the Railroad was not a
party to the case, so in hindsight it seems clear that the case was not a labor dispute
of the sort Congress intended to assign to the Adjustment Board. But the defendant
union argued that the Railroad should have been joined as a party,33 and this
27
28

Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 504 (2006).
Conley, 355 U.S at 44-45.

29

Id. at 43.

30

Id.

31

Id. at 44-45.

32

Cf. United Transp. Union v. Gateway W. Ry., 78 F.3d 1208, 1213-1214 (7th Cir. 1996)
(The Railway Labor Act requires that “when the precise character of the dispute is in
doubt . . . a federal court should not proceed, for the [National Mediation Board] has primary
jurisdiction to determine whether it has exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute.”) (quoting
United Transp. Union v. United States, 987 F.2d 784, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (internal quotation
marks omitted)). The Adjustment Board involved in Conley is an arm of the Mediation Board
created by the Railway Labor Act. See 45 U.S.C.S. § 153(w) (LexisNexis 2011).
33

Conley, 355 U.S. at 45.
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argument was not frivolous. Most of the plaintiffs’ allegations were not about the
union’s treatment of the plaintiffs: they alleged, instead, that the Railroad was
administering the union contract in a discriminatory way, “with the active or tacit
consent of the union.”34 The Supreme Court saw no basis in the record yet for a
joinder of the Railroad (although it had to acknowledge such a basis might
emerge).35 This ruling on the slim factual record, leaving the Railroad out of the
case, deactivated what would otherwise have been a classic jurisdictional paradox.
The contrary determination—that the Railroad was a necessary defendant in the
case—would arguably have stripped the federal courts of the power to make any
finding at all, since the NRAB would then have had exclusive jurisdiction.36 In such
a scenario, a federal court might decide a question at issue only to learn as a result,
retroactively, that it was not the right body to decide questions in the case. Fearing
entanglement in such paradoxes, many courts in similar cases struggle to define the
basis for dismissal, sometimes calling it jurisdictional and sometimes calling it
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.37
The Court in Conley reversed the district court’s jurisdictional dismissal and
instructed it to take the case. Because the facts did not point to necessary joinder of
the Railroad, Conley was able to follow the lead of a slightly older case, Bell v.
Hood, which not only set the standard for a finding of jurisdiction but also sought to
minimize occasions for the jurisdictional paradox just described:
Where the complaint, as here, is so drawn as to seek recovery directly
under the Constitution or laws of the United States, the federal court . . .
must entertain the suit . . . . The reason for this is that the court must
assume jurisdiction to decide whether the allegations state a cause of
action on which the court can grant relief as well as to determine issues of
fact arising in the controversy.38
In other words, the legal sufficiency of the complaint—its success in stating a
claim—defines the court’s duty. But regardless of whether the court has a duty to
offer relief, it must first determine whether it has power to hear the question: hence,
the jurisdictional determination is distinct from and precedent to the merits
question.39 The standard is lenient: if federal law is properly invoked, jurisdiction
should be declined only if the Rule 8(a)(1) statement is “wholly insubstantial and
34

Id. at 46.

35

Id. at 45 (“This is not a suit, directly or indirectly, against the Railroad. . . . If an issue
does develop which necessitates joining the Railroad either it or the respondents will then
have an adequate opportunity to request joinder.”).
36

See Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen v. CSX Transp., Inc., 455 F.3d 1313, 1316
(11th Cir. 2006) (NRAB findings cannot be reviewed in federal court unless they overstep the
Board’s jurisdictional mandate).
37

See generally Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits, 80 WASH. L. REV. 643
(2005).
38

Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681-82 (1946) (emphasis added).

39

See generally Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) (insisting on
the priority of determining plaintiff’s standing, which enables subject-matter jurisdiction, and
insisting that courts should so do so in an analysis distinct from adjudging whether the
complaint properly alleges the elements required by the statute).
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frivolous.”40 This teaching of Bell is affirmed in a distinct and nearly undisturbed
line of cases41 in which the Court sought to lay to rest what seems to be a perennial
confusion between a court’s power and its duty. This tradition culminates with
Arbaugh v. Y. & H. Corp.,42 a unanimous ruling that sought to law down a clear
mandate: afterward, the Court hoped, the distinction between jurisdiction and merits
would be easy to discern and maintain.43 But the jurisdictional facts are not always
resolved as easily as they were in Conley. Even with a bright-line rule, courts have
continued to struggle with this issue.44
B. Statutory Requirements are Rarely Jurisdictional
Unlike the aggrieved employees in Conley, the plaintiff in Arbaugh v. Y & H
Corp. had a simple statutory basis for her federal claim: she alleged, and proved to a
jury, that she had been sexually harassed at her place of employment, the Moonlight
Cafe. The federal statute known as Title VII establishes that such sexual harassment
claims can be brought to federal court.45 But the facts were more complicated than
40

Bell, 327 U.S. at 682-83 (“[The only] exceptions are that a suit may sometimes be
dismissed for want of jurisdiction where the alleged claim , , , clearly appears to be immaterial
and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly
insubstantial and frivolous.”).
41

See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 352 n.2 (1996); Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l
Rifle Ass’n Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 97 (1994); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Cnty.
of Kent, 510 U.S. 355, 365 (1994) (“The question whether a federal statute creates a claim for
relief is not jurisdictional.”); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env’l Study Grp., 438 U.S. 59, 70
(1978); Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Cnty. of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 667 (1974) (courts
should find jurisdiction unless federal claim is “so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by
prior decisions of this Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a
federal controversy”); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 542 n.10 (1974) (“Once a federal
court has ascertained that a plaintiff’s jurisdiction-conferring claims are not insubstantial on
their face, no further consideration of the merits of the claims is relevant to a determination of
the court’s jurisdiction of the subject matter.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted); Powell
v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 512-16 (1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198-204 (1962);
Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 359 (1959). But see Bowles v.
Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007) (“the timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a
jurisdictional requirement”); Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc.,
484 U.S. 49, 67 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending that majority decision “misreads
statute to create a peculiar new form of subject-matter jurisdiction”). Bowles appears to have
been confined to its particular context. See Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237,
1250 (2010) (Ginsberg, J., concurring) (attempting to reconcile Arbaugh and Bowles on the
principle of stare decisis). Compare Bowles, 551 U.S. at 214 (statutory limit on appeal of
ordinary civil case is jurisdictional) with Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011)
(statutory limit on appeal of benefits decision to Veterans Court is not jurisdictional, and is
subject to equitable tolling). See generally Howard Wasserman, The Demise of “Drive-by
Jurisdictional Rulings,” 105 NW. L. REV. 184-202 (2011).
42
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511 (2006) (“On the subject-matter
jurisdiction/ingredient-of-claim-for-relief dichotomy, this Court and others have been less
than meticulous.”).
43

Steel Co., 523 U.S. 83 (1998).

44

See infra discussion in Part IV.

45

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (2006).
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the law: it emerged after the trial was over that because of its payroll structure, the
Moonlight Cafe did not, under the technical definition of “employee,” actually have
enough employees to be subject to the statute.46 The defendant discovered that this
argument was available only after the trial was over. It was too late to assert that
Arbaugh had failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted, in a 12(b)(6)
motion.47 The issue had not been preserved for appeal. The defendant would have
to pay the $40,000 initially ordered by the federal court, even though Congress had
not intended it to be reached by the law. Two weeks after the verdict, however, the
employer made a different motion, which is allowed at any time, even after trial: a
motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.48 According to this
argument, the cafe, employing fewer than fifteen people, had not had its conduct as
an employer placed under the jurisdiction of the federal courts.49 The entire case
should be undone, not because of an error of law, but because that error meant it had
come to the wrong court.
Arbaugh presented very clearly the classic problem of distinguishing between
jurisdiction and merits—one that had created a circuit split with regard to Title
VII50—and also an indication of why the difference matters. A court that lacks
jurisdiction must forswear all its power over a controversy, even after it has already
ruled, whereas a claim that misreads the law or fails to satisfy its prerequisites
nonetheless comes under the court’s power because it “arises under” a federal
statute.51 Usually, the plaintiff loses before federal discovery either way, but in this
instance, the Supreme Court faced a true controversy on the question of why she
should have lost. Did the trial court lack the power to issue its verdict, or only the
duty? If dismissal should have occurred for 12(b)(1) reasons of judicial power, the
error would be corrected and the plaintiff sent away to try her luck in state court; if it
should have been for 12(b)(6) reasons of judicial duty, the erroneous (but just)
verdict would be upheld.
Arbaugh won. A statute’s inapplicability does not alter the jurisdiction of a
federal court to decide whether it applies. Justice Ginsburg, writing for a unanimous
court, overruled the Fifth Circuit’s precedents52 that had established the employeenumerosity requirement of Title VII as jurisdictional:
[W]hen Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as
jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in
46

Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 509 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006)).

47

See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(2) (specifying “at trial” as the last opportunity for such a
motion).
48
Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 506 (“Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or
otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the
action.”) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3)).
49

Id. at 504.

50

See Da Silva v. Kinsho Int’l Corp., 229 F.3d 358, 364-66 (2d Cir. 2000) (listing
conflicting cases in different circuits, and holding correctly that “the threshold number of
employees for application of Title VII is not a jurisdictional issue”).
51

See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) (granting federal courts jurisdiction for all civil disputes
properly invoking a federal law).
52

See, e.g., Greenlees v. Eidenmuller Enters., Inc., 32 F.3d 197, 198 (5th Cir. 1994).
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character. Applying that readily administrable bright line to this case, we
hold that the threshold number of employees for application of Title VII is
an element of a plaintiff's claim for relief, not a jurisdictional issue.53
In settling this question, the Court not only laid down a clear rule for federal
district courts to follow; it also made clear its intent with regard to the distinct
character of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Arbaugh ruling punctuated the series of
cases in which the Supreme Court voiced its disapproval of quick dismissals that
interpret a statute while purporting to invoke Rule 12(b)(1)—what the Court has
repeatedly called “‘drive-by jurisdictional rulings’ that should be accorded ‘no
precedential effect.’”54 Repeatedly over the last two decades, the Supreme Court has
expressed its frustration with federal courts declining jurisdiction when they should
instead dismiss cases on the merits.55 Correct doctrine, the Court insists, requires a
sharp distinction to be maintained. There is a qualitative difference between what a
federal court can do, but should not (on the merits); and what it arguably should do,
but cannot (for lack of jurisdiction).
Unless Congress clearly specifies otherwise, a law is activated in federal court
whenever it is invoked, and the court must take jurisdiction even if the complaint
misreads the law. In holding to this effect, Arbaugh seems on its face to lay to rest
for lower courts the distinction between jurisdiction and merits.56 But the same
might have been said about the resounding logical victory of Justice Scalia over
Justice Stevens in 1996,57 or Bell v. Hood itself, or an equally confident and assertive
explanation laid down by Justice Holmes in 1908.58 The problem of distinguishing
jurisdiction from merits seems to be passed from generation to generation.59
53
54

Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 516.
Id. at 511 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998)).

55

See generally Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 88-102 (holding that federal court must decide first
whether there was any injury to establish standing of plaintiffs, and therefore jurisdiction of
court, in claim against a steel and pickling company tardy in complying with the
environmental-records requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 11046 (2006), before the court decides
whether the statute’s creation of a private cause of action against noncompliant entities
allowed for such retroactive suits) (emphasis added).
56

See also United States v. North Carolina, 180 F.3d 574, 581 (4th Cir. 1999) (denying
12(b)(1) motion because “while the merits and jurisdictional questions are not identical, they
are so closely related that the jurisdictional issue is not suited for resolution in the context of a
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction”) (citing Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d
1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982)).
57
Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 118-119 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Bell demonstrates that the
Court has the power to decide whether a cause of action exists even when it is unclear whether
the plaintiff has standing”) (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 685 (1946)); see also id. at 119
n.9 (professing to see no “fundamental difference between arguing: (1) plaintiff’s complaint
does not allege a cause of action because the law does ‘not provide a remedy’ for the
plaintiff’s injury; and (2) plaintiff’s injury is ‘not redressable’ [for standing purposes]”); id. at
96 (Scalia, J.) (“[n]ot only is this not true, but the whole point of Bell was that it is not true,”
because money damages would have provided redress if they had not been disallowed on the
merits).
58

Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 234-35 (1908). (“No doubt it sometimes may be
difficult to decide whether certain words in a statute are directed to jurisdiction or to merits,
but the distinction between the two is plain. One goes to power, the other only to the duty of
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C. Determining Power Before Determining Duty: Progress in Eliminating “Driveby Jurisdictional Rulings”
Steadily, over time, the Court’s persistent rejection of jurisdictional grounds for
dismissals on the merits had the desired effect in lower courts.60 The teaching of
Arbaugh and other cases in the same vein was being heeded in the years leading up
to Iqbal.61 In the Sixth Circuit, for example, in January 2006, a panel reasoning by
analogy heeded Supreme Court decisions from 2004 and 2005 and “departed from
[its] usual rule that one panel may not overrule a prior panel.”62 The issue was
whether a necessary dismissal in the district court should have been characterized as
a jurisdictional problem or a failure to state a claim,63 and, as in Arbaugh, there was
something riding on the outcome.
The defendants in the case, a couple named Gunter, had had their medical costs
covered by a tortfeasor, and then had been sued for reimbursement by their health
plan to prevent a windfall.64 The parties did not realize that the statute apparently
authorizing the suit had been interpreted in 2002 to create injunctive relief only, and
not to allow for awards of money.65 Moreover, the Sixth Circuit had found, based on
dicta in two dissenting opinions, that this was a jurisdictional issue,66 and the District
Court accordingly should have dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. Instead, it heard the case and found that as a factual matter the Gunters
were entitled to keep all the money in question, roughly $75,000. In the process,
however, the Gunters racked up attorney’s fees of $67,000; they petitioned the court
for reimbursement in turn from the health plan, under a pertinent Employee
the court. . . . Whether a given statute is intended simply to establish a rule of substantive law,
and thus to define the duty of the court, or is meant to limit its power, is a question of
construction and common sense.”).
59
See Wasserman 2011, supra note 41, at 201-02 (“The Court apparently is not finished
undoing profligate and non-meticulous use of the concept of jurisdiction, moving towards a
sharper distinction between judicial adjudicative authority on the one hand and merits or
procedure on the other.”).
60
See, e.g., Montez v. Dep’t of Navy, 392 F.3d 147, 150 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[W]here issues
of fact are central both to subject matter jurisdiction and the claim on the merits, we have held
that the trial court must assume jurisdiction and proceed to the merits.”).
61

See, e.g., Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 592 (8th Cir. 2009) (“The
district court erred by conflating the issue of Braden’s Article III standing with his potential
personal causes of action under ERISA.”).
See generally Howard M. Wasserman,
Jurisdiction, Merits, and Substantiality, 42 TULSA L. REV. 579, 580-84 (2007).
62

Primax Recoveries, Inc. v. Gunter, 433 F. 3d 515, 516 (6th Cir. 2006).

63

See id. at 517 (“Generations of jurists have struggled with the difficulty of
distinguishing between Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) in federal question cases.”) (quoting
Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1188 (2d Cir. 1996)).
64

Id. at 516-17.

65

See id. at 517 (citing Great W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 221
(2002)); see also Knudson, 534 U.S. at 222, 224 (dissenting Justices Stevens and Ginsberg
characterizing the outcome in that case as a jurisdictional one).
66
Id. (citing QualChoice, Inc. v. Rowland, 367 F. 3d 638, 642 (6th Cir. 2004) and
Community Health Plan of Ohio v. Mosser, 347 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 2003)).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol60/iss3/10

12

2012]

RIPPLE EFFECTS

811

Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) provision for successful defendants.67
With admirable chutzpah, the plaintiff then pointed out correctly that it should have
lost not on the merits, but for jurisdictional reasons, without a trial. In response, the
district court held that it had never had jurisdiction over the case and therefore could
not award the attorney’s fees.68 The Gunters pressed the question in the Sixth
Circuit, pointing out two intervening Supreme Court decisions.
Even though those decisions seemed to have nothing to do with the Gunters’
case, they were utterly persuasive to the Sixth Circuit panel. In them, as in Arbaugh,
the Supreme Court had continued to fight the good fight against jurisdictional
treatments of legal defects in the pleadings. One ruling had held that a defense
arising from a certain Bankruptcy Rule was a merits defense, not a jurisdictional one,
and therefore could not be raised after trial.69 The other had held that the time limit
in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 had the same nonjurisdictional status,
giving the state an argument that had to be raised up front, and not as a collateral
attack on jurisdiction.70
From these unrelated high-court rulings on matters of bankruptcy and criminal
procedure, the Primax Court got the message about Rule 12(b)(1).71 The Court
changed the Circuit standard on the jurisdictional character of the original error,
vacated the District Court’s disavowal of subject-matter jurisdiction, and awarded
attorney’s fees to the Gunters: “Our application of Eberhart and Kontrick to the
instant case faithfully adheres to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence where, as here,
both the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction and the substantive claim for relief are
based on the same federal statute.”72 Accepting jurisdiction and deciding what the
law permits are separate matters. An initial error of law should not be compounded
with an error of doctrine.
Having taken a case and created an outcome, a court should not itself later
disavow its own power to do what it did, as if the bell of litigation can be unrung.
Primax demonstrates that even before Iqbal, there were practical reasons behind the
Supreme Court’s consistent urgings that courts should accept their subject-matter
jurisdiction. Now those reasons have been augmented, because the Court has
created different standards for evaluating jurisdiction and legal sufficiency.
II. STATING A CLAIM: FROM CONLEY TO IQBAL
Whereas Rule 12(b)(1) regulates the proper invocation of a federal court’s
power, Rule 12(b)(6) is concerned with the threshold a complaint must then clear to
“state a claim,” allowing the plaintiff to issue subpoenas and discovery requests. For
constitutional and practical reasons, this gate to the discovery process is being
guarded more and more zealously. First, more-conservative justices, under the aegis
of “restraint,” are increasingly inclined to turn plaintiffs away while invoking the

67

29 U.S.C. § 1132(g) (2006).

68

Primax Recoveries, Inc. v. Gunter, 433 F.3d 515, 517 (6th Cir. 2006).

69

Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455-56 (2004).

70

Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12 (2005) (per curiam).

71

Primax, 433 F.3d at 519.

72

Id. (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998)).
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constitutional imperative of federal courts’ limited jurisdiction.73 Second, and more
relevant here, courts are becoming more aware that clearing the 12(b)(6) obstacle
enables plaintiffs to subject their adversaries to the machinery of civil litigation
itself.74 In recent years, the Supreme Court decided to make that machinery more
difficult to activate.
A. Twombly Dismissals Prevent Speculative Discovery Proceedings
With the growth of organizations of all kinds,75 the improvement of recordkeeping technology,76 and the increased generosity of tort law both as to liability and
as to damages,77 litigation itself, as a process and a prospect, has become a powerful
weapon. As discovery has become more expensive, motions to dismiss before
discovery for failure to state a claim have become more important. The rulings in
Twombly and Iqbal were the culmination of a steadily increasing awareness in the
higher courts that discovery should, in some cases, be more difficult to initiate. To
allege the basis for a cause of action, plaintiffs should not simply name, or break
down into its elements and recite, the law they wanted to invoke: they needed to
allege facts. 78
73
See, e.g., Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1560-61 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(en banc) (Scalia, J., joined by Bork and Starr, JJ., dissenting from remand for factual
development) (“Having ignored one jurisdictional restraint and distorted another, the majority
proceeds to treat the merits of this case with what seems to me an incomprehensible disregard
of traditional principles of equitable discretion, bordering on if not surpassing the
constitutional limits established by the principle of separation of powers.”), vacated for
reconsideration in light of Congressional action, 471 U.S. 1113 (per curiam); see also Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 586 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing the de Arellano dissent
and arguing that “judicial interference in domains [of antiterrorism] destroys the purpose of
vesting primary responsibility in a unitary Executive”).
74
See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 742-43 (1975) (“[T]he mere
existence of an unresolved lawsuit has settlement value to the plaintiff . . . because of the
threat of extensive discovery.”).
75

Compare The Fortune 100: 1957, CNNMONEY (2012), http://money.cnn.com/
magazines/ fortune/fortune500_archive/full/1957/index.html (indicating that the total 1957
revenues for the one-hundred largest U.S. companies was $115 billion, the equivalent in 2007
dollars of $869 billion), with The Fortune 100: 2007, CNNMONEY (2012),
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2007/full_list/index.html (indicating that
the total 2007 revenues for the one-hundred largest U.S. companies was $6,088 billion). See
also Inflation Calculator, DOLLARTIMES (2012), http://www.dollartimes.com/calculators/
inflation.htm.
76

See Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) (noting in dispute over costs of electronic discovery that when “the costs of storage are
virtually nil . . . [i]nformation is retained not because it is expected to be used, but because
there is no compelling reason to discard it. And, even if data is retained for limited purposes,
it is not necessarily amenable to discovery.”).
77
See, e.g., Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 816 (Cal. 1989) (tracing “the development
of common law recognition of a protectable interest in individual peace of mind.”).
78

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007); see Richard A. Epstein, Bell
Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25
WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 61, 94 (2007) (arguing that Twombly was correct, because courts can
capably adjudge pleadings implausible based on “a full account of all public information”).
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For many decades this commonsense doctrine79 did not enter the common law at
the highest levels, with one important exception. Over a sustained period, circuit
courts adopted a heightened pleading standard for allegations of conspiracy, which is
a crime or tort likely to develop (if at all) behind closed doors, and therefore to be
pled based on speculation. On the circuit level, the common law developed to
require judges to cast a skeptical eye on allegations of conspiracy, even before
discovery.80 For many decades, circuit courts’ special treatment of conspiracy “was
a narrow exception to the notice-pleading standard of Rule 8 of the civil rules—a
rare example of a judicially imposed requirement to plead facts in a complaint
governed by Rule 8.”81 This tradition with regard to conspiracy claims would inform
the Supreme Court’s eventual reinterpretation of pleading standards in Twombly and
Iqbal.
The heart of the Twombly doctrine is that a complaint’s allegations about illegal
conduct behind closed doors must be plausible inferences from conduct the plaintiff
knows about.82 If all the facts shown in a pleading can be very readily explained, as
a matter of basic common sense, without any wrongdoing involved, the “doors of
discovery” should not be unlocked for the plaintiff to peruse the defendant’s files.83
Hence, cases should be ended at the motion-to-dismiss stage when all the facts
plaintiff can allege leave the court unconvinced that there is any “reason to infer that
[the defendants] had agreed among themselves to do what was only natural
anyway.”84 The doctrine prevents antitrust litigation that amounts to a shakedown,
using discovery rather than the prospect of an actual judgment to create leverage.85
79
See, e.g., Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) (court
need not accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations); Kowal v. MCI
Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (same).
80

See Slotnick v. Staviskey, 560 F.2d 31, 33 (1st Cir. 1977) (“It has long been the law in
this and other circuits that complaints cannot survive a motion to dismiss if they contain
conclusory allegations of conspiracy but do not support their claims with references to
material facts.”); accord Loubser v. Thacker, 440 F.3d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 2006); Walker v.
Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005, 1007-08 (7th Cir. 2002); Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 862
(2d Cir. 1997); Young v. Biggers, 938 F.2d 565, 569 (5th Cir. 1991); Powell v. Jarvis, 460
F.2d 551, 553 (2d Cir. 1972); Fletcher v. Hook, 446 F.2d 14, 15-16 (3d Cir. 1971); Jackson v.
Nelson, 405 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 1968); Powell v. Workmen’s Comp. Bd., 327 F.2d 131,
137 (2d Cir. 1964). See generally Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Realism of Judges Past and
Present, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 77 (2009) (outside the context of particular cases, judges
generally concede readily the truth of the “realist” doctrine that they use their individual
judgment and common sense, and “make law”).
81

Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967, 970 (7th Cir. 2009) (Posner, J.).

82

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 566-67 (holding “allegations of parallel conduct” inadequate to
state a claim for antitrust conspiracy).
83

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

84

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 566; see also Tam Travel, Inc. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 583 F.3d
896, 909 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he plausibility of plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim [stemming from
price cuts] is inversely correlated to the magnitude of defendants’ economic self-interest in
making the cuts.”) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
588 (1986) (summary judgment context)).
85
See Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94
IOWA L. REV. 873, 930 (2009) (arguing that different pleading standards for different kinds of
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The complexity of antitrust discovery was an important factor spurring the Court
to “retire” the Conley pleading standard.86 Writing for the Court, Justice Souter
spent two paragraphs on the high costs of discovery, and remarked that additional
caution was called in very large cases, since litigation itself would be so expensive.87
In a way, the spirit of Twombly reflects a growing sense that corporate litigation
itself was absorbing too many national resources.88
Antitrust was a perfect context for the court to affirm a stricter understanding of
Rule 8(a)(2).89 In this context, the court could draw on the background circuit-court
tradition of rejecting unsupported, conclusory allegations in conspiracy cases, while
also looking to the future, which held the prospect that antitrust discovery would
grow more expensive as corporations grew larger.90 Justice Souter noted that other
procedural safeguards were already in place specifically for antitrust,91 because
innocent parallel conduct so often resembled anticompetitive conspiracies: hence, in
a way, the holding of Twombly was simply that “an allegation of parallel conduct
and a bare assertion of conspiracy will not suffice . . . in order to make a [Sherman

cases would allow for better screening of frivolous cases, “sensitive to the different reasons
for meritless filings”); see also Tam Travel, 583 F.3d at 914 (Merritt, J., dissenting)
(expressing dire concern that excessive application of Twombly in dissimilar cases is “slowly
eviscerating antitrust enforcement under the Sherman Act,” leading to widening class
inequality).
86

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563.

87

Id. at 559 (observing that “plaintiffs represent a putative class of at least 90 percent of
all subscribers to local telephone or high-speed Internet service in the continental United
States, in an action against America’s largest telecommunications firms.”). But see Edward D.
Cavanagh, Twombly, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Courts, 82 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 877, 882-89 (2008) (arguing that the Court underestimated the extent to which discovery
can be managed to contain costs); Arthur Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A
Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 64 (2010) (same).
88

See Saritha Komatireddy Tice, A “Plausible” Explanation of Pleading Standards, 31
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 827, 830 (2008) (“[Twombly] reflects a significant shift away from
the litigation-promoting mindset embodied in Conley and instead solidifies what has been a
growing hostility toward litigation.”); see also id. at n.81 (citing Andrew M. Siegel, The Court
Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s
Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1097 (2006)).
89

See also Baim & Blank, Inc. v. Warren-Connelly Co., 19 F.R.D. 108, 109 (S.D.N.Y.
1956) (“The modern ‘notice’ theory of pleading is not sufficient when employed in a
complaint under the anti-trust laws.”).
90
Cf. Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 746 (1976) (“[I]n antitrust
cases, where ‘the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators,’ dismissals prior to
giving the plaintiff ample opportunity for discovery should be granted very sparingly.”
(quoting Poller v. Columbia Broad., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962) (in turn citing Conley, 355 U.S.
at 45-46))).
91

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
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Act] § 1 claim.”92 It was not immediately clear whether the plausibility standard
should even be applied outside the antitrust context.93
B. Iqbal Dismissals Prevent Litigation of Conspiracy Theories
Two years later, in Iqbal, the Supreme Court made clear that it was not only for
massive corporations that claims of liability must be found “plausible.”94 Again,
however, the context was important: the defendants were highly placed members of
the executive branch of the U.S. government. In such a context, the doctrine of
qualified immunity reflects courts’ concern about subjecting defendants to the
discovery process on the basis of an inadequately specific complaint.95 Qualified
immunity is intended to protect public officials from the litigation process by
allowing summary dismissal when the constitutional right allegedly violated was not
clearly established, even if the plaintiff’s version of events is true.96 Like the
Twombly context, this situation was a fitting one for a reinterpretation of the
pleading standard: both antitrust actions and citizen lawsuits against officials exact
high perceived costs from defendants, regardless of their liability, and might be
brought speculatively.97 In both scenarios, because the target is such a prominent
one, courts feel an additional duty to observe the principle that “The issue is not

92

Id. at 556-557; see also id. at 561 n.7 (“neither parallel conduct nor conscious
parallelism, taken alone, raise[s] the necessary implication of conspiracy”).
93
See Jochum, supra note 24, at 511 (describing pre-Iqbal “discussion among scholars
that [Twombly] was limited to the realm of antitrust cases”).
94
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (rejecting plaintiff’s attempt to confine
Twombly to the antitrust context: “[o]ur decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard
for ‘all civil actions’” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56)).
95
Id. at 672 (qualified immunity is “both a defense to liability and a limited entitlement
not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation” (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.
511, 526 (1985))); see also Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 235-36 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“There is tension between the rationale of Harlow [requiring qualified immunity
determinations as early in a case as possible] and the requirement of malice, and it seems to
me that the heightened pleading requirement is the most workable means to resolve it.”).
96
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 685 (“Litigation, though necessary to ensure that officials comply
with the law, exacts heavy costs in terms of efficiency and expenditure of valuable time and
resources that might otherwise be directed to the proper execution of the work of the
Government.”); see also Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007) (Cabranes, J.,
concurring) (“The Supreme Court’s recognition in Bell Atlantic that ‘proceeding to . . .
discovery can be expensive’ has particular resonance where, as here, discovery would not only
result in significant cost but would also deplete the time and effectiveness of current officials
and the personal resources of former officials.” (citing Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1967)); Sharratt
v. Murtha, 437 F. App’x 167, 168, 170 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Iqbal in dismissing on qualified
immunity grounds lawsuits against former Congressman John Murtha “for statements Murtha
had made to the press relating to Sharratt and other Marines’ culpability for the deaths of
several Iraqis in 2005”).
97

See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 670 (central issue of case as balance between liberal pleading
rules and “qualified immunity privilege rooted in the need to preserve the effectiveness of
government as contemplated by our constitutional structure” (quoting Hasty, 490 F.3d at 178
(Cabranes, J., concurring))).
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whether plaintiff will prevail, but whether he is entitled to [develop and] offer
evidence to support his claims.”98
The plaintiff in the 2009 case, Javaida Iqbal, alleged religious and racial
discrimination in the decision to place him under high-security conditions after his
arrest on immigration charges in the wake of the September 11 attacks.99 He alleged
that all Muslims arrested at that time pursuant to Federal Bureau of Investigations
(FBI) investigations in the region were flagged as “high interest,” even without
individuated suspicion of links to terrorism.100 The Supreme Court took judicial
notice of a Department of Justice (DOJ) Inspector General’s report, indicating that in
fact only 184 out of 762 of those arrested after FBI questioning had been flagged as
“high interest” and subjected to harsh solitary confinement, as Iqbal had been.101
While noting that the allegations of mistreatment by prison guards clearly stated a
civil-rights claim,102 the Court went on to dismiss Iqbal’s complaint as to the cabinetlevel officials he accused of formulating and implementing discriminatory policies,
because no such policies were needed to explain his injury. The Court asserted, “[i]t
should come as no surprise that a legitimate policy directing law enforcement to
arrest and detain individuals because of their suspected link to the attacks would
produce a disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims, even though the purpose of
the policy was to target neither Arabs nor Muslims.”103 The Court set aside Iqbal’s
allegations of discriminatory policy-making, noting that “the Federal Rules do not
require courts to credit a complaint’s conclusory statements without reference to its
factual context.”104 In such a scenario, when innocent conduct can explain bad
outcomes, defendants with important jobs to do should be protected not just from
liability but from the discovery process.105 The ruling expressly extended Twombly
to all civil actions, and created ripple effects through the conduct of U.S. civil
litigation.106

98
United States v. Yale New Haven Hosp., 727 F. Supp. 784, 786 (D. Conn. 1990) (citing
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).
99
100

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 666.
Id. at 669.

101

Id. at 667 (citing Inspector General’s report online “as visited May 14, 2009,” four days
before issuance of the ruling, and “available in Clerk of Court’s case file”).
102

Id. at 682.

103
Id.; cf. Ramzi Kassem, Iqbal and Race: Implausible Realities: Iqbal’s Entrenchment of
Majority Group Skepticism Towards Discrimination Claims, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1443,
1474-75 (2010) (because plausibility is subjectively determined by judges often lacking
minority perspective, “Iqbal raises the concern that Muslim and other minority plaintiffs
asserting discrimination claims may fare poorly unless pleading standards are readjusted”).
104

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 686.

105

See Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 152 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Qualified immunity is an
immunity from suit and not just a defense to liability.” (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,
200 (2001))).
106

See, e.g., Doe v. Bd. of Regents, 280 Neb. 492, 506 (Neb. 2010) (adopting
Twombly/Iqbal standard as its own interpretation of NEB. CT. R. PLDG. § 6-1108(a)(2)). But
see Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422, 431 (Tenn. 2011)
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The procedural holdings of Twombly and Iqbal altered the ground rules for
virtually all disputes in all federal courts, but they should be understood in context.
The goal in each case was to protect preoccupied defendants from expensive
factfinding: conspiracy theorizing should not on its own open enormous corporate
file vaults or overcome qualified immunity. Twombly was about two corporate
entities that made similar decisions, and whether there was any reason at all to
suppose them collaborators. Iqbal was about the policymakers John Ashcroft and
Robert Mueller, and whether there was any reason at all to suppose they initiated
Iqbal’s discriminatory treatment. As the Eighth Circuit later explained, the gist of
each ruling was simply that “[a]n inference pressed by the plaintiff is not plausible if
the facts he points to are precisely the result one would expect from lawful conduct
in which the defendant is known to have engaged.”107
In each case, the Court believed a lawful explanation, much simpler than
conspiracy, was more than enough to account for the plaintiff’s harm.108
Corporations are by nature ruthless in competition; antiterrorism dragnets are by
nature (according to the five-justice majority in Iqbal) liable to capture the innocent.
A plaintiff’s misfortune does not imply a dastardly cause. Plaintiffs who are, by the
light of “judicial experience and common sense,”109 clearly just victims of
circumstance should not be encouraged to waste social resources trying to prove
policy wrongdoing—or allowed to extract settlements with onerous discovery
requests. Hence, the problem with each complaint was not really that it had
disobeyed pleading rules, but that, for a majority of the Court, it disintegrated at
even a touch of Occam’s Razor.110
Iqbal and Twombly are true to their circuit-court roots in heightened pleading
standards for conspiracy claims.111 Both rulings purport to dismiss conspiracy
(declining to apply Iqbal to state rules of civil procedure); Jochum, supra note 24, at 521-27
(arguing that Ohio should not adopt the standard).
107

Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 597 (8th Cir. 2009).

108

See also Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 411 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J.,
dissenting) (explaining the new pleading standard as part of the reason to uphold a dismissal:
“[W]hen a bank turns down a loan applicant because the appraisal of the security for the loan
indicates that the loan would not be adequately secured, the alternative hypothesis of racial
discrimination does not have substantial merit; it is implausible”); cf. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor
Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 326 (2007) (holding that under the heightened “strong
inference” pleading standards of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, a claim of
fraudulent intent (scienter) was well pled if “a reasonable person [would] deem the inference
of scienter at least as strong as any opposing inference”).
109

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Hasty, 490 F.3d. at 157-58).

110

Occam’s Razor is the principle that the simplest explanation will be the most plausible
until evidence is presented to prove it false. Cf. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680 (explaining that
allegation about defendants in Twombly was “not only compatible with, but indeed was more
likely explained by, lawful, unchoreographed free-market behavior” (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 567 (2007))).
111
See Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 2009) (readily applying heightened
Iqbal pleading standards, despite lack of antitrust or immunity issues, because instant case,
involving plaintiff diagnosed with Munchausen syndrome by proxy, bore earmarks of
“paranoid pro se litigation, arising out of a bitter custody fight and alleging, as it does, a vast,
encompassing conspiracy”), cert. denied, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 4191 (May 24, 2010).
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theorizing.112 To point out this policy context is not to question the decisions’
precedential value. The Court certainly knew that it was altering how Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) would be interpreted in every court in every case in the
country.113 Conspiracy theories had never been enough in conspiracy cases, and
henceforth they would not be enough in any case.114 After Iqbal, the Court knew,
entitlement to relief would have be “shown,” as Rule 8(a)(2) says, and not merely
stated as a legal conclusion. But the shared feature of these two cases—conspiracy
claims—is instructive. The Court’s agenda was not simply to heighten all pleading
standards, regardless of their procedural context.115
The Court said nothing in specific about altering pleading standards for
statements of subject-matter jurisdiction. Nonetheless, Twombly and Iqbal would be
taken by many courts to alter the interpretation of Rule 8(a)(1) as well as Rule
8(a)(2). This extension of the doctrine, almost never explained, ignores the fact that
(a)(1), unlike (a)(2), requires no “showing”—only a statement of the court’s
jurisdiction—and the fact that jurisdiction is quite different from entitlement to
relief. And the reinterpretation is doubly strange in light of the Arbaugh line of
cases in which the Court had striven to emphasize the distinction between 12(b)(1)
and 12(b)(6) contexts. Nonetheless, in part because of cross-references and habits
that courts had developed for analyzing 12(b) motions, Iqbal is now being used to
make plaintiffs’ jurisdictional statements, like their conspiracy theories, into objects
of skepticism.
III. THE NATURE OF THE ERROR: JURISDICTIONAL PLEADING AND THE
PLAUSIBILITY STANDARD
Considerable attention has been paid to the question of whether Twombly and
Iqbal “heightened pleading standards”: the purpose of a complaint, since the middle
of the twentieth century, had simply been to put the defendant on notice about its
alleged wrongdoing, so the defendant would know what the suit was about.116
112

See McCauley v. City of Chicago, No. 09-3561, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 21179, at *40
(7th Cir. Oct. 20, 2011) (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (urging liberal grants of leave to amend
complaints after Iqbal, because “[i]mplausible pleadings do harm primarily by failing to
ground themselves sufficiently in reality such that defendants can know what is claimed”).
The opportunity to amend a facially implausible complaint allows plaintiffs with reasonable
theories of official wrongdoing to distinguish themselves from conspiracy theorists.
113

See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 579 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (bemoaning the Court’s choice to
“rewrite the nation’s civil procedure textbooks”).
114

Compare Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 683 (noting that once theorizing was set aside, the “only
factual allegation against petitioners accuses them of adopting a policy approving restrictive
conditions of confinement for . . . suspected terrorists,” and not of any wrongdoing), with
Collins v. Miller, 338 F. App’x. 34, 35 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order affirming dismissal of
habeas petition that alleged due process violation, because plaintiff “has not plausibly pleaded
that secret in-chambers proceedings . . . actually occurred,” and because court docket showed
no proceedings on date in question).
115
Accord Bone, supra note 85, at 890 (placing Twombly in its factual context to argue that
generalized “aggressive screening through stiff pleading is not what the Supreme Court
intended”).
116
See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512-13 (2002) (reaffirming liberal
“notice pleading” standard); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence &
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Perhaps, after Twombly, this was no longer the point of a complaint, and perhaps
plaintiffs needed to engage in “pre-discovery” on their own to sleuth out extra facts
to make their case seem substantial and “plausible” on the face of the pleadings. It is
now generally understood that this interpretation is wrong.117 The court must still
assume that concrete facts and sensible inferences118 are true.
The Court took care to forestall misunderstanding of the plausibility standard by
issuing a strong reaffirmation of notice pleading just a few weeks after Twombly, in
Erickson v. Pardus.119 There, a prisoner’s allegations about denial of medical
treatment were held to be ample even without specifics, and the Court deplored the
Tenth Circuit’s “departure from the liberal pleading standards set forth by Rule
8(a)(2).”120 Most courts carefully noted the juxtaposition of the two cases121 and
strove to understand the elusive distinction between plausibility and proof—the first
now required under Twombly, and the second still not required.122 As a result few
courts require abundant detail in allegations in the 12(b)(6) context, and Twombly
has been received as the Supreme Court intended.123 In another area, however, the
effects of these watershed cases were not so carefully managed.
A. How Iqbal is Misread to Alter Jurisdictional Pleading Standards
Even though they touched on matters of corporate accountability to law and of
fundamental civil rights, the Twombly and Iqbal rulings hinged on their close
reading of one of the clauses of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Justice Souter, in Iqbal, was reinterpreting only Rule 8(a)(2): the requirement of
plausibility, he wrote, stemmed directly from the “the threshold requirement of Rule
Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (same). See generally Peter Julian, Note,
Charles E. Clark and Simple Pleading: Against a “Formalism of Generality,” 104 NW. U. L.
REV. 1179 (arguing that Twombly and Iqbal are true to the doctrinal balance of rigidity and
flexibility advocated by the principal architect of the Federal Rules).
117

See, e.g., Arista Records LLC v. Doe, 604 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2010) (rejecting the
notion that “Twombly imposed a heightened standard that requires a complaint to include
specific evidence, factual allegations in addition to those required by Rule 8, [or] declarations
from the persons who collected the evidence”).
118

See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 696 (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining the ruling in Twombly and
the level of implausibility—“claims about little green men”—that should trigger dismissal).
119

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P.
8(a)(2)).
120

Id. at 94.

121

See Jochum, supra note 24, at 509-10 (proposing that the Court in Erickson “wished to
strategically reinforce that notice pleading under Conley had not been eliminated”).
122

See also Hamilton v. Palm, 621 F.3d 816, 818 (8th Cir. 2010) (following Arbaugh,
albeit without citing it, to consider under 12(b)(6) “how the general principles of Twombly and
Iqbal apply to the pleading of . . . whether a party was an employee,” and holding the
allegation of employee status sufficient).
123

See Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter
Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 556 (finding that through August 2009 “the rate at
which [12(b)(6)] motions were granted increased from Conley to Twombly to Iqbal, although
grants with leave to amend accounted for much of the increase”).
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8(a)(2) that the ‘plain statement’ possess enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is
entitled to relief.’”124 In like fashion, Justice Kennedy held in Iqbal that when a
complaint offers only legal conclusions, with the defendant’s name inserted, “the
complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to
relief.’”125 Both justices emphasize that 8(a)(2) requires some factual predicate, to
enable the complaint to “show” the basis for relief. But Rule 8(a)(1), unlike Rule
8(a)(2), does not require such a “showing”—only a “clear and plain statement of the
grounds for the court’s jurisdiction.”126 On the face of the law, then, Twombly and
Iqbal do not apply to jurisdictional challenges under Rule 12(b)(1).127
Both rulings ground their analysis in Rule 8(a)(2), and Justice Souter, in
Twombly, was careful to limit the effect of the opinion’s reasoning to Rule 12(b)(6):
the issue was narrowly whether a claim had been stated against Bell Atlantic. In
Iqbal, however, Justice Kennedy in one place omitted the key qualifier: “To survive
a motion to dismiss [sic], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”128 These
words were quoted by federal courts 1,853 times in 2010 alone, and 2,475 times in

124

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).

125

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).

126

FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1) (emphasis added).

127

But see FED. R. CIV. P. 9(a)(1) (“Except when required to show that the court has
jurisdiction, a pleading need not allege a party’s capacity to sue or be sued; a party’s authority
to sue or be sued in a representative capacity; or the legal existence of an organized
association of persons that is made a party.”) (emphasis added). Although it contains the word
“show,” Rule 9(a)(1) has been construed to mean simply that in the narrow class of cases in
which jurisdiction is implicated by the “capacity” in which parties appear, plaintiffs must state
the proper role for each party in the litigation. See Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th
Cir. 1989) (dismissing suit because complaint failed to specify that it was against state official
“in personal capacity,” to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1983),
overruled, Moore v. City of Harriman, 272 F.3d 769, 774 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (capacity
can be determined from any part of the course of proceedings that puts the defendant on
notice, and even a response to a motion to dismiss can “clarify any remaining ambiguity”).
The requirement to state each party’s capacity is enforced only loosely; indeed, the Supreme
Court brushed the issue aside even in a case in which subject-matter jurisdiction was in
question and the complaint was defective. Compare Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 24 (1991)
(“Because this issue is not properly before us, we simply reiterate the Third Circuit’s view that
it is obviously preferable for the plaintiff to be specific in the first instance to avoid any
ambiguity.”) (internal quotation marks omitted), with Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455
(2004) (Supreme Court should raise sua sponte any possible deficiency in subject-matter
jurisdiction (quoting Mansfield, C. & L. M. R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)).
Nonetheless, on the face of the Rules it is arguable that Iqbal should apply in such cases. See,
e.g., Local 153 Health Fund v. Express Scripts, Inc., No. 4:05-cv-00862, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 90470, at *27 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 7, 2007) (six months after Twombly, threatening to
dismiss ERISA action for lack of jurisdiction in light of Rule 9(a)(1) because “aside from the
unsubstantiated statement that Plaintiff is a trustee, Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege any
facts to establish its status as a fiduciary” to satisfy jurisdictional requirement of 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a)—but granting two weeks to amend the complaint and add a fiduciary party).
128

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
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2011.129 Although the sentence includes the phrase “state a claim,” its first phrase
seems to suggest that it should apply to any motion to dismiss. Courts have not been
slow to read it that way. Indeed the sentence has often been quoted in contexts
unrelated to the adequacy of the pleadings under Rules 8(a)(2) and 12(b)(6).130 Only
a few highly attentive courts have properly doctored the sentence’s opening phrase
to make it precise.131
Even without this misleading sentence, lower federal courts were highly likely to
apply Iqbal in the context of 12(b)(1) motions, because over the years many courts
had gotten used to invoking 8(a)(2) standards to define 8(a)(1) standards. This
equation made sense, despite the teaching of Bell, because the mechanical
requirements and assumptions in handling facts for the two motions were the same.
The assertion was embedded in the boilerplate language of countless federal courts:
“The standards applied to a [facial] Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss are the same as
those that apply to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.”132
This statement—though it appears in various forms in countless binding circuit
precedents—is no longer true.
Twombly and Iqbal created a split between the threshold for factual grounding
for a well-stated claim under Rule 8(a)(2) and the (unchanged) threshold for a
129

Lexis search of federal-court rulings for first thirteen words of quoted language (search
conducted Jan. 10, 2012).
130

In fact this sentence has been cited in virtually every conceivable Rule 12 context. See
Cisco Sys. v. United States, No. 04-135, 2011 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 141, at **5 (Ct. Int’l
Trade Nov. 18, 2011) (quoting the sentence in a judgment on the pleadings for lack of
jurisdiction, Rules 12(c) and 8(a)(1)); White v. Green, 382 F. App’x 199, 201 (3d Cir. 2010)
(per curiam) (quoting the sentence in affirming grant of motion to dismiss for insufficient
service of process, Rule 12(b)(5)); Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 360 Fed. App’x 847, 849 (9th
Cir. 2009) (in affirming dismissal due to the jurisdictional bar of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunity Act, Rule 12(b)(1)); Vivendi SA v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 586 F.3d 689, 694 (9th
Cir. 2009) (in affirming dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens, Rule 12(b)(3));
Kaplan v. Evans, No. 4:11-CV-00153, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147227, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Dec.
22, 2011) (in dismissing RICO claims for failure to allege fraud with particularity under the
special pleading requirements of Rule 9(b), Rule 12(b)(6)); see also Acute Care Specialists II,
Ltd. v. United States, No. 11-C-465, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144155, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 14,
2011) (applying Iqbal in evaluating status of parties to determine that the court “lacks subject
matter jurisdiction” due to jurisdictional requirements for tax claims, Rule 12(b)(1));
Risktimetry Analytics, LLC v. Altaira, LLC, 752 F. Supp. 2d 141, 142 (D. Mass. 2010)
(applying Iqbal in considering motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, Rule
12(b)(2)).
131

See, e.g., Fournerat v. Wis. Law Review, 420 F. App’x 816, 819 (10th Cir. 2011) (“To
survive a motion to dismiss [under Rule 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter . . . .” (brackets in original) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678)); Van Tassel v. Lawrence
Cnty. Domestic Relations Section, 659 F. Supp. 2d 672, 687 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (same).
132

E.g., Bishop v. Crawford, No. 1:11-CV-11, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137227, at *4-5
(E.D. Mo. Nov. 30, 2011) (citing Vankempen v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 923 F. Supp. 146,
147 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (in turn citing Satz v. ITT Fin. Corp., 619 F.2d 738, 742 (8th Cir.
1980))); see also, e.g., Tucker v. Am. Int’l Grp., 745 F. Supp. 2d 53, 57 (D. Conn. 2010)
(“The standards for dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) are ‘substantively
identical.’”) (quoting Kroposki v. Fed. Aviation Admin., No. 08-CV-01519, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 76084, at *3 (D. Conn. Aug. 26, 2009) (in turn citing Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 318
F.3d 113, 138 (2d Cir. 2003))).
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statement of jurisdiction under Rule 8(a)(1).133 In the context of a challenge to the
legal (i.e., facial) adequacy of a jurisdictional statement, the Federal Rules continue
to require, as before, total deference to the facts as alleged in the complaint.134
Erroneously, though, lower courts have taken to applying the “plausibility” standard
to such facts.
B. Plausibility Standards Are Unnecessary for the 12(b)(1) Motion
The facial 12(b)(1) ruling traditionally required total credulity of the judge in
reading the complaint’s facts; in this it always resembled the 12(b)(6) ruling. Now,
though, judges must require the complaint in 12(b)(6) analyses to be plausible. It
might seem sensible to require the same in evaluating jurisdiction. It might be
argued, indeed, that total deference to plaintiff’s version of the facts is less, not
more, appropriate when jurisdiction is at stake. After all, a court that wrongly
assumes jurisdiction over a case commits a more significant error than one that
allows discovery in a lawsuit of dubious substantive merit. But standard procedural
doctrine already allows a defendant—or a court itself—to contest the factual
predicate of the basis for jurisdiction, and to call for discovery on that issue alone, as
a question of fact.135
Courts have, indeed, consistently recognized that there are two kinds of 12(b)(1)
motions to dismiss: the “facial” and the “factual” challenges.136 A plaintiff has
always been given the benefit of any factual doubt in the former case, when a
12(b)(1) motion challenges the plaintiff’s legal understanding of the situation. In the
latter case, however, when the truth of the predicate facts is questioned, the court
resolves the factual dispute, calling for a limited form of discovery, and satisfies
133

See Shepherd, supra note 8, at 2329-30 (“Although a Rule 12(b)(1) facial attack and a
Rule 12(b)(6) challenge to the claim have similar procedural requirements, this similarity does
not dictate the wholesale importation of the Rule 12(b)(6) standard into the Rule 12(b)(1)
context.”). But cf. S.I. Strong, Jurisdictional Discovery in United States Federal Courts, 67
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 489, 569 (2010) (arguing in favor of “extending the plausibility
standard to include jurisdictional facts under Rule 8(a)(1) and then applying that standard to
motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(2)”).
134
This deference does not excuse plaintiffs from stating a prima facie case for personal
and subject-matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., RSM Prod. Corp. v. Fridman, 643 F. Supp. 2d 382,
402 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Plaintiffs’ ‘expectation’ that discovery will uncover additional
evidence of Browne’s general contacts with New York as well as of Browne’s New Yorkbased acts with respect to the alleged conspiracy, is, in fact, an ‘unfounded fishing
expedition,’ and does not adequately support its request for jurisdictional discovery.”
(citations omitted)); see also id. at 393-94 (distinguishing standards of review for
jurisdictional challenges from Twombly standard for 12(b)(6) motion).
135
See, e.g., LeBlanc v. Cleveland, 198 F.3d 353, 356 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[W]here
jurisdictional facts are placed in dispute, the court has the power and obligation to decide
issues of fact by reference to evidence outside the pleadings.”).
136

See, e.g., Ohio Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1990)
(explaining the two types of 12(b)(1) motions); Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th
Cir. 1981) (“The district court . . . has the power to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction on any one of three separate bases: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint
supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented
by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts.” (emphasis added)).
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itself that the realities of the situation actually create jurisdiction. 137 With notable
exceptions,138 Iqbal has not altered courts’ approach to classic factual challenges to
jurisdiction.
The facial 12(b)(1) challenge, like the traditional 12(b)(6) challenge, simply calls
into question the adequacy of the pleadings. It is this challenge that has traditionally
been described as affording the plaintiff the same procedural safeguards as the
12(b)(6) motion. Using that old description, many courts since Iqbal have begun
applying its reinterpreted 12(b)(6) standard to facial jurisdiction challenges. Such
application defies the teaching of Bell and Arbaugh that Rules 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(2)
serve different purposes and set different kinds of requirements. At some point it
will become necessary for the Court to prevent further erosion in lower courts’
handling of the doctrine by clarifying that Iqbal does not apply to the 12(b)(1)
motion. The error is both an effect and a cause of a threatened erosion of the
jurisdiction/merits doctrine in lower courts. When this erosion began, improved
understanding of that doctrine had continued to filter into the lower courts since
Arbaugh.139 More importantly, however, the same doctrine has been followed
through at the Supreme Court level.
C. Iqbal Did Not Alter the Supreme Court’s Insistence on Leniency in Deciding
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Since jurisdictional and merits issues are sometimes intertwined, it might be
questioned whether application of Iqbal to 12(b)(1) motions is in fact an error at
all.140 It is certainly possible, despite the focus on Rule 8(a)(2) in Twombly, that in
2007 and 2009 the Supreme Court in fact intended to make subject-matter
jurisdiction harder to establish under Rule 8(a)(1), hence mandating reading of
complaints that are generally more skeptical.141 This would mean that Iqbal should
137
See generally Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Fact, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 973, 975
(describing and justifying “a lower standard of proof [that] prevails for jurisdictional
purposes” on any question of fact that overlaps merits and jurisdiction). See also Strong, supra
note 133, 497-508, 523-33.
138

See discussion of Animal Sci. Prods., infra note 174-78 and accompanying text.

139

See, e.g., Ayyash v. Bank Al-Madina, No. 04-cv-9201, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9677, at
*11 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2006) (noting “significant consequences” that can result from the
error in categorization, and remarking that “the Supreme Court’s decision in Arbaugh may
require that the Court of Appeals review its treatment of the question of RICO’s
extraterritorial effect”); id. at *19 (ordering jurisdictional discovery). For an admirably
precise and succinct statement of the correct standards for jurisdictional challenges after Iqbal,
see Arocho v. Nafzinger, No. 07-cv-02603, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11673, at *4-5 (D. Colo.
Jan. 14, 2009) (personal jurisdiction analysis should have included official acts), rev’d on
other grounds, 367 F. App’x 942, 948-49.
140

Cf. Jayne S. Ressler, Plausibly Pleading Personal Jurisdiction, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 627,
630 (applying the “insights of Twombly . . . to the vexing problem of personal jurisdiction,”
Rule 12(b)(2)).
141
See also United States ex rel. Miller v. Bill Harbert Int’l Constr., Inc., 608 F.3d 871, 882
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (applying Iqbal to the amendment of a complaint, to determine whether its
allegations should be allowed to “relate back” under Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 15(c)), cert. denied
sub nom. Bill Harbert Int’l Constr., Inc. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2443, 2443 (2011); Junk
v. Terminix Int’l Co., Ltd. P’ship., 628 F.3d 439, 445 (8th Cir. 2010) (determining that the
Iqbal standard should not be applied to determinations of fraudulent joinder under Fed. R.
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in fact be read to encourage courts to grant 12(b)(1) as well as 12(b)(6) motions. A
landmark case from 2010, however, reaffirmed the two key holdings of the Arbaugh
line of cases: that jurisdiction and merits are very different things, and that
jurisdiction should be accepted regardless of the quality of the complaint’s nonfrivolous factual allegations.
The issue in Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd. was whether U.S. securities fraud
laws applied to foreign conduct by a foreign-owned company. The plaintiffs were
foreign investors, but they claimed the fraud had been carried out by acts within the
United States.142 In a factual challenge under Rule 12(b)(1), the defendants had
contended that there was not enough U.S. subject matter to invoke the court’s
jurisdiction.143 The appeals court had followed the Second Circuit’s well-respected
jurisprudence on securities fraud issues, and accordingly dismissed the case for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction.144 The Supreme Court, in a straightforward first
section to its ruling, corrected this “threshold” procedural error and added Morrison
to the line of cases reversing deplorable “drive-by jurisdictional rulings.”145 Justice
Scalia explained that jurisdiction should not have been the issue: “to ask what
conduct § 10(b) reaches is to ask what conduct § 10(b) prohibits, which is a merits
question.”146 This meant that the analysis should have been conducted under Rule
12(b)(6), requiring the plaintiffs to allege enough facts to invoke the securities-fraud
laws.147 The complaint was factually adequate, but the Court interpreted the statute
to hold that it did not apply in such cases, and hence dismissed the case for failure
“to state a claim on which relief can be granted.”148 As in the pre-Iqbal line of cases,
therefore, the Court was at pains to emphasize the distinct nature of the two key
Civ. Proc. Rule 20), cert. denied sub nom. Breneman v. Junk, 132 S. Ct. 95, 95 (2011); Nathan
Leber, Solving a Pleading Plague: Why Federal Courts Should Strike Insufficient Affirmative
Defenses Under the Twombly-Iqbal Plausibility Standard, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming
2013).
142

Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2876 (2010).

143

See In re Nat’l Austl. Bank Sec. Litig., No. 03-Civ.-6537, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
94162, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2006) (district court specifying that challenge was factual and
that the court could consider matters outside the pleadings).
144

Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 173 (2d Cir. 2008) (analyzing
jurisdiction under the “‘conduct test’: identify which action or actions constituted the fraud
and directly caused harm . . . and then determine if that act or those actions emanated from the
United States” (citing IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017 (2d Cir. 1975))); cf. Romero v
Int’l Terminal Oper. Co., 358 U.S. 354, 393-94 (1959) (holding extraterritorial reach of statute
a question of statutory interpretation, and not of the Court’s jurisdiction); Lauritzen v. Larsen,
345 U.S. 571, 577-79 (1953) (same).
145
See Elizabeth Cosenza, Paradise Lost: § 10(b) after Morrison v. National Australia
Bank, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 343, 368 (2011) (“[T]he distinction between subject matter
jurisdiction and the ingredient of the claim is among the reasons the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in the National Australia Bank case.”).
146

Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877.

147

Cf. Castiglione v. Papa, 423 F. App’x 10, 12 (2d Cir. 2011) (wrongly identifying
Morrison as “involving a 12(b)(1) motion” and then incorporating Iqbal plausibility
requirements into the description of the standard of review for such motions).
148

Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2888 (invoking Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol60/iss3/10

26

2012]

RIPPLE EFFECTS

825

constituents of the complaint—jurisdiction on the one hand, and adequacy of the
claim on the other. Morrison was a resounding reaffirmation of Arbaugh, and a
clear signal from the court, again, that 12(b)(1) motions deal with different types of
question from 12(b)(6) motions. As Morrison shows, the Court has held steadily
after Iqbal to the reasoning of Arbaugh.149 In many cases, too, lower courts continue
to follow this lead.150 Morrison, and the other cases distinguishing merits from
149
See also Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011) (“Because the
consequences that attach to the jurisdictional label may be so drastic, we have tried in recent
cases to bring some discipline to the use of this term.”); Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130
S. Ct. 1237, 1244 (2010) (“Our recent cases evince a marked desire to curtail such ‘drive-by
jurisdictional rulings,’ which too easily can miss the ‘critical difference[s]’ between true
jurisdictional conditions and nonjurisdictional limitations on causes of action.” (citation
omitted) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998), and
Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 456 (2004))).

The court’s zeal for preventing drive-by jurisdictional rulings has reached a fever pitch: In
2012, the Court interposed a footnote in the landmark case confirming the existence of a
“ministerial exception” preventing certain employment-discrimination claims against religious
organizations. Hosanna-Tabor Evang. Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity
Comm’n, 132 S. Ct. 694, 714 n.4 (2012). The footnote resolved a “conflict [that] has arisen in
the Courts of Appeals over whether the ministerial exception is a jurisdictional bar or a
defense on the merits . . . . We conclude that the exception operates as an affirmative defense
to an otherwise cognizable claim, not a jurisdictional bar.” Id. (citing Morrison, 130 S. Ct.
2869 at 2877); accord Howard M. Wasserman, Prescriptive Jurisdiction, Adjudicative
Jurisdiction, and the Ministerial Exemption, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 287, 295
(2012), available at http://www.pennumbra.com/essays/02-2012/Wasserman.pdf (seeking to
“unpack why the exemption is, in fact, a merits doctrine”). Contra Gregory A. Kalscheur,
Civil Procedure and the Establishment Clause: Exploring the Ministerial Exception, SubjectMatter Jurisdiction, and the Freedom of the Church, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 43, 69-81
(distinguishing Arbaugh and arguing that the bar should be jurisdictional, because the
Constitution’s constraints on court power—not the statute—place decisions about ministerial
employment “beyond the reach of the law” (citing Rayburn v. Gen. Conf. of Seventh-Day
Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1171 (4th Cir. 1985))).
This result suggests that fact-intensive ministerial-exception inquiries will now probably be
handled in the summary-judgment context, since unlike in factual 12(b)(1) challenges,
12(b)(6) procedures constrain courts from looking outside the complaint. To reach that stage,
plaintiffs will need to satisfy Iqbal by pleading facts in the complaint plausibly showing their
non-ministerial status.
The Court’s explanation in Hosanna-Tabor was perplexing, since it should have been true
regardless of whether 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6) was implicated: “District courts have power . . . to
decide whether the claim can proceed or is instead barred by the ministerial exception.”
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 714 n.4. This observation does not eliminate the possibility of a
jurisdictional bar, since it is axiomatic that any court has the power to decide in the first
instance whether it has jurisdiction or not.
150

See, e.g., Jahn v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., No. 10-1364, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144412,
at *31 (D.D.C. Dec. 15, 2011) (dismissing inadequately stated claim under Iqbal standard, and
separately dismissing under traditional “notice pleading” standard claims barred for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies); Pittsburgh Mack
Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 580 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2009) (“the
existence of a union contract is not a jurisdictional requirement” under the Labor Management
Relations Act).
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jurisdictional determinations, suggest that the plaintiff confronted with a facial
12(b)(1) motion has kept all those safeguards, even though Iqbal now denies them to
a plaintiff confronting a 12(b)(6) motion.
After Iqbal, then, a challenge to the facts in a complaint can be correctly
adjudicated in one of three ways. Consider the crude hypothetical of a cruise-ship
passenger alleging in federal court that he suffered emotional distress intentionally
inflicted by a crew-member’s actions while officiating a shuffleboard game in
American territorial waters. The defendant may move for dismissal on the basis that
tort law is preempted on cruise ships by a Congressionally mandated regime of
shuffleboard-dispute arbitration: this would be a facial 12(b)(1) challenge, and
despite Iqbal no plausibility in the factual pleadings is required. The defendant
might, however, contend that the story told in the complaint is far more plausibly
explained by unintentional conduct, and that the lawsuit fails to achieve plausibility
as a matter of law. This argument would call for analysis of the complaint under the
Iqbal standard, taking the plaintiff’s version of events as true but ignoring
conclusory legal assertions.151 Or yet again, the defendant may argue that the ship
was several miles farther out to sea than the plaintiff claims, and that as a factual
matter, the court lacks jurisdiction.152 In this latter case, a factual 12(b)(1) challenge,
the court would require discovery to be taken on the factual question of the ship’s
location, and accord no presumption of truth to the plaintiff’s allegations about
latitude and longitude. This three-tiered scheme serves the two distinct rationales of
the jurisdiction and merits dismissal motions, while also retaining the principle that
the court must satisfy itself as to its jurisdiction if predicate facts are disputed.
A typical appearance of the Iqbal 12(b)(1) error, harmless in its context, occurs
in a Tenth Circuit ruling on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity in 2010: the
issue, in light of the constitutional constraint on federal courts’ jurisdiction over state
governments, was whether the Oklahoma Tax Commission and its officials could be
sued. Their defense of sovereign immunity (unlike the qualified immunity at issue
in Iqbal) called into question the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction—its power to
hear the case. The court, as many decades of precedent suggested, noted that since
the challenge was a facial, not a factual one, “we apply the same standards under
Rule 12(b)(1) that are applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to
state a cause of action.”153 As it happened, it did not need to do so: the plaintiffs’
151
See, e.g., Lobegeiger v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., No. 11-21620, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
93933, at *55 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 23, 2011) (applying Iqbal in tort suit under admiralty law, and
dismissing claim for gross negligence because “the Complaint does not contain any factual
allegations indicating Anderson Teak was aware the Brianna Sun Lounger presented an
increased risk of injury”).
152

But see Friedman v. Cunard Line Ltd., 996 F. Supp. 303, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding
that admiralty jurisdiction, and federal common law, are available on the high seas as long as
there is a nexus with U.S. maritime commerce (citing East River Steamship Corp. v.
Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864-65 (1986))); Coastal Fuels Mktg., Inc. v. Fla.
Express Shipping Co., 207 F.3d 1247, 1251 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[W]hen neither statutory nor
judicially created maritime principles provide an answer to a specific legal question, courts
may apply state law provided that the application of state law does not frustrate national
interests in having uniformity in admiralty law.”).
153

Muscogee Nation v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 611 F.3d 1222, 1227 n.1 (10th Cir. 2010);
accord Waters v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, No. 11-cv-17, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44972,
at *2-3 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 26, 2011) (in facial 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss based on sovereign

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol60/iss3/10

28

2012]

RIPPLE EFFECTS

827

theories about overcoming sovereign immunity were legally inadequate rather than
implausible.154 Later, though, citing Iqbal, the opinion concluded on a 12(b)(6) issue
that the tribe had failed to state a “plausible” claim.155 It would be easy for a lower
court reading the opinion to deduce that insufficiently pled factual allegations as to
jurisdiction should be governed by Iqbal.
By contrast, a Colorado court in 2011 was careful in deciding a sovereignimmunity issue to distinguish between subject-matter jurisdiction over the case and
the legal sufficiency of the case.156 The court declined to apply Iqbal:
Defendants explain that their motion to dismiss contends that Plaintiff has
failed to plausibly plead his claims, and they argue that they are entitled to
sovereign immunity from claims that are not plausibly pled . . . .
Defendants confuse the information that Plaintiff must plead [under Rule
8(a)(1)] to establish their waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to
the type of claims he is asserting with the information that Plaintiff must
plead [under Rule 8(a)(2)] to establish that his specific claims are facially
plausible.157
The first kind of “pleading information” is relevant to 12(b)(1) motions, the
second to 12(b)(6) motions. Treating these types of factual allegations in the same
way, the court explained, would entangle jurisdictional questions with the
substantive plausibility analysis: “The fact that Defendants believe that Plaintiff’s
claims are facially implausible does not implicate the doctrine of sovereign
immunity or the Court’s jurisdiction over the claims.”158 This opinion’s echoes of
Bell v. Hood and Steel Company show that this reasoning is in line with longstanding
Supreme Court precedent on the generous standard for statements of jurisdiction,
and the fact that that determination is distinct from the standard for statement of an
adequate claim.159 Those cases teach that courts should not automatically apply
Iqbal to issues of subject-matter jurisdiction.
immunity, “the Court applies the same standard applicable to Rule 12(b)(6) motions” (citing
Ohio Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1990) and Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
154

Muscogee, 611 F.3d at 1232 (holding Eleventh Amendment jurisdictional analysis for a
suit against state officials requires only a “straightforward inquiry into whether the complaint
alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as
prospective” rather than plausibility) (quoting Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 535
U.S. 635, 645 (2002)).
155

Id. at 1237 (specifying allegations that would have made the complaint adequate).

156

Sattar v. Holder, No. 07-cv-02698, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63623, at *5-6 (D. Colo.
June 16, 2011) (refusing to dismiss facially implausible claim for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction).
157

Id. at *2-6 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009)).

158

Id. at *7; cf. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (“[T]he
absence of a valid (as opposed to arguable) cause of action does not implicate subject-matter
jurisdiction, i.e., the courts’ statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.”).
159

Compare Sattar, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63623, at *7 (“[I]t is not improper for the
Court to determine at the outset of a case that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim
that appears very likely to fail on its merits.”), with Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946)
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D. Plausibility Standards are Unnecessary for the Facial 12(b)(1) Motion
The approach taken by the Sattar court, distinguishing Iqbal contexts from
jurisdictional contexts, was adopted by the Ninth Circuit in September, 2011, in
Maya v. Centex Corp. Addressing a question about a plaintiff’s standing, the circuit
court rejected the defendant’s attempt to apply plausibility analysis: “[rather than
standing,] Twombly and Iqbal deal with a fundamentally different issue.”160 The
plaintiff’s standing truly implicates jurisdiction, the court’s power to hear a case,
because if the action proceeds when it is lacking, the court oversteps the
constitutional requirement to address true controversies only.161 Standing therefore
should be addressed under Rule 12(b)(1). Hence, in Maya, the district court had
erred by addressing standing under Rule 12(b)(6)—and, accordingly, it had erred by
applying Iqbal. The court of appeals explained:
Twombly and Iqbal are ill-suited to application in the constitutional
standing context because in determining whether plaintiff states a claim
under 12(b)(6), the court necessarily assesses the merits of plaintiff’s
case. But the threshold question of whether plaintiff has standing (and the
court has jurisdiction) is distinct from the merits of his claim.162
This admirable clarity on standing doctrine and civil procedure exemplifies a
court that has learned the teaching of Arbaugh and its associated cases.
The Maya circuit-court holding did not mean that the trial court should have
ignored the defendants’ challenge to the facts establishing plaintiffs’ standing, and
simply assumed all the allegations were true. In fact, as a result of the error, the trial
court had “unnecessarily limited the scope of its review.” Since the challenge was to
jurisdictional facts, the judge should not have relied on the complaint’s allegations,
but should have called for evidence to satisfy herself of the court’s jurisdiction.163 In
scrutinizing the complaint only, then dismissing the case with prejudice, the judge
had used Iqbal not to reject the sufficiency of the claim, but to deploy the wrong
procedure and divest the court of power to resolve it.
The approach to jurisdictional challenges after Iqbal taken by the Ninth Circuit in
Maya sets up a circuit split with the Eighth Circuit. As discussed below, boilerplate
in the Eighth Circuit establishes that subject-matter jurisdiction challenges are

(“[J]urisdiction . . . is not defeated . . . by the possibility that the averments might fail to state a
cause of action on which petitioners could actually recover.”).
160

Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 2011).

161

See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361-62 (1911) (if the court were to rule on
a law’s constitutionality outside the context of deciding the rights of the litigants in justiciable
controversies then “in a legal sense the judgment could not be executed”).
162

Maya, 658 F.3d at 1068 (citing Bell, 327 U.S. at 682).

163

As explained supra, notes 135-36 and accompanying text, a factual challenge to
jurisdiction places the burden on the plaintiff, and frees the court from analyzing the
complaint alone. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983) (“The
plaintiff must show that he has ‘sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some
direct injury’ as a result of the [defendant’s] conduct. . . .” (emphasis added)). A facial
challenge should lead to lenient reading of the complaint, but applying Iqbal instead confines
the court to scrutinizing the complaint while requiring a plausible showing jurisdictional facts.
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addressed under the Iqbal and Twombly plausibility standard.164 As a result, a panel
of the Eighth Circuit in a 2009 case, Zanders v. Swanson, addressed the threshold
question of standing under this standard.165 The issue was whether the plaintiffs
could challenge a law under which they feared prosecution; they claimed that this
fear chilled their free speech. The requirement in such cases was that the fear of
prosecution be “objectively reasonable,”166 and the court held that in this case it was
not. In reaching the determination that the asserted chill was based on a fear that
was “too speculative,” the court deployed Twombly’s requirement of plausibility,
applying it this time not to a conspiracy theory but to a future possibility: “It is too
speculative for standing purposes to allege that this statute could be manipulated or
that the police might misuse the criminal justice system for retaliatory purposes . . . .
Plaintiffs have thus not ‘nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible.’”167 It is unclear, given the interplay of “reasonable” and “plausible” in
this opinion, whether its holding could have been reached without the rhetoric of
Twombly and the erroneous application of its heightened standard.168
The Arbaugh line of cases, with their purposeful clarity on doctrine, demolish the
Zanders court’s premise that a jurisdictional evaluation should be conducted in the
same way as an evaluation of a claim’s legal merits. Zanders, indeed, typifies the
emergence of a new kind of “drive-by jurisdictional ruling.” In such a ruling, a
164

See Part V infra.

165

Zanders v. Swanson, 573 F.3d 591 (8th Cir. 2009).

166

Id. at 594 (citing Republican Party of Minn. v. Klobuchar, 381 F.3d 785, 792 (8th Cir.
2004)). Zanders addressed Article III standing, which implicates subject-matter jurisdiction;
see further discussion infra at Part V.A. So-called prudential standing raises different
questions. Unlike Article III standing, prudential standing does not implicate the existence of
subject-matter jurisdiction, only the court’s willingness to exercise it. Elk Grove Unified Sch.
Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004); see, e.g., Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC,
Inc., 634 F.3d 787, 795 n.2 (5th Cir. 2011) (“Unlike a dismissal for lack of constitutional
standing, which should be granted under Rule 12(b)(1), a dismissal for lack of prudential or
statutory standing is properly granted under Rule 12(b)(6).”). It is appropriately addressed
under Iqbal standards. See, e.g., Selevan v. N.Y. Thruway Auth., 584 F.3d 82, 92 (2d Cir.
2009) (in section on prudential standing, rejecting defendant’s de minimis harm argument
because “we need only consider whether the complaint alleges a plausible claim that the
regulation violates the Commerce Clause” (emphasis added) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566
U.S. 662, 678-769 (2009)).
167
Zanders, 573 F.3d at 594 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570
(2007)). Notably, the court reached this conclusion despite the fact that one of the plaintiffs
actually claimed she had herself been charged under the challenged statute, for purposes that
were at least implicitly improper. Her individual case was dismissed not because it involved a
conspiracy theory, but under an abstention doctrine because she was still involved in state
court proceedings.
168

See also Novak v. Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. Admin., No. 1-10-cv-0677, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 34249, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 30, 2011) (not distinguishing between facial and
factual jurisdictional challenges in stating that “surviving a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is
more difficult” than satisfying the Twombly/Iqbal standard (citing United Phosphorus, Ltd. v.
Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 946 (7th Cir. 2003) (factual challenge to subject matter
jurisdiction))); id. at *11-12 (referring to what “appears to be alleged” in the complaint, rather
than investigating the factual predicate of eligibility, to determine whether plaintiffs were
eligible for Medicaid at the right time to establish injury, standing, and therefore jurisdiction).
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federal court finds that an inadequately “plausible” pleading under the Iqbal standard
divests the court of power to hear the case, even though longstanding precedent,
undisturbed by Iqbal, allows for jurisdictional discovery to establish the predicate
facts. Like the “drive-by rulings” deplored by the Supreme Court in no uncertain
terms,169 these decisions result when the doctrines of jurisdiction and legal
sufficiency are muddled, and they exacerbate that confusion. In these increasingly
common rulings, courts unjustifiably apply to all components of a complaint the
skepticism that Twombly and Iqbal encouraged for the treatment of conspiracy
allegations.170
The approach taken in Zanders is contradicted not just by the Ninth Circuit, but
also by other law of the Eighth Circuit. In another case involving standing, a
different panel of the Eighth Circuit clearly applied separate standards for standing
and legal merits:
Whether Braden may pursue claims on behalf of the Plan at all is a
question of constitutional standing [i.e., subject-matter jurisdiction] which
turns on his personal injury. Whether relief may be had for a certain
period of time is a separate question, and its answer turns on the cause of
action Braden asserts.171
After correctly clarifying that its approaches to jurisdiction and the merits were
distinct, this panel reversed the lower court’s finding that there was no injury in
fact.172 Only after settling the jurisdictional question of standing did the court turn to
the 12(b)(6) motion at issue, and invoke Iqbal.
E. Reading Iqbal too Broadly Undermines Rule 12 Jurisprudence
The confusion created in some lower courts by the multiple standards for
motions to dismiss is hard to overstate. One court appeared to invoke all three
standards at once for the purposes of an inquiry into standing.173 In another instance,
169

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998).

170

This error is not prevented in circuits where the appeals court has maintained careful
distinctions between Iqbal requirements and standing requirements. See, e.g., MVP Asset
Mgmt. (USA) LLC v. Vestbirk, No. 2:10-cv-02483, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889, at *11
(E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2012) (using the Iqbal standard to dismiss a claim that used a “bare
allegation” of the occurrence of a transaction to establish standing); Tini Bikinis-Saginaw,
LLC v. Saginaw Charter Twp., No. 11-10280, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147249, at *18 (E.D.
Mich. Dec. 22, 2011) (quoting Iqbal in dismissing three of four claims for mootness, ripeness,
and lack of standing, Rule 12(b)(1)); Stabiner v. United States, No. 11-3782, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 141574, at *6 (D.N.J. Dec. 9, 2011) (quoting Iqbal in dismissing tax claims for lack of
standing, as relief was only declaratory).
171

Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 592 (8th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added).

172

Id. (sustaining jurisdiction for the moment because “[a]t this stage in the litigation it is
impossible to say” with certainty whether the timing of events supports the plaintiff’s standing
(quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (“standing must be shown
‘with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the
litigation’”))).
173

NB v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 10-1511, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86908, at *3-5 (D.D.C.
July 29, 2011) (positing, for purposes of a single 12(b)(1) motion, the Conley standard, the
factual-challenge standard burdening the plaintiff, and the Twombly standard, and concluding,
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the complexity of the new three-tiered scheme utterly baffled the District Court of
New Jersey, which reached a novel result by increasing the pleading standards for
factual, rather than facial, 12(b)(1) motions. Since factual challenges had never been
tested by the 12(b)(6) standard, the rationale for this extension of Iqbal is worth
quoting at length. The question at hand was whether a factual dispute on an issue
deemed jurisdictional under binding circuit precedent should be resolved by
discovery or by analysis of the pleadings. The court improvised:
[I]t appears logical for the Supreme Court’s guidance in Iqbal to have at
least a ripple effect on the standard applicable to factual challenges. Since
the Supreme Court in Iqbal expressly guided that a plaintiff cannot obtain
discovery with regard to his/her claims unless the plaintiff actually spells
out the facts underlying these claims, the same guidance—if applied to
factual rather than facial review—must yield the rule that a plaintiff
cannot obtain discovery with regard to evidence verifying jurisdiction. . . .
[A]llowing the plaintiff to conduct discovery for the purposes of factual
challenge would result in an anomalous rule granting the plaintiff a
broader pleading latitude for the purposes of the test under which the
plaintiff’s pleadings are not even granted presumption of truth.174
In the context of a factual 12(b)(1) challenge, this court made what seems a
natural extrapolation from Twombly and Iqbal: if pleading standards are raised for
merits evaluations, they must be accordingly raised for jurisdictional evaluations.
What the court missed, however, was the underlying rationale of Iqbal, which was to
prevent costly, broad-ranging discovery on the merits, directed by the plaintiff.
Iqbal was not intended to prevent tightly focused jurisdictional discovery to satisfy
the court on its power to hear the case. The court should have conducted more
discovery; this would have reduced the need for analysis and surmise, in a ruling that
spanned two-hundred pages, with regard to the factual predicates of the case.175
On appeal, the circuit court followed the reasoning of Arbaugh and overruled its
earlier precedent, thus establishing that the question being decided in the district
court was a merits question and not a jurisdictional one.176 This meant that on
“Simply put, a pleading requires more than just ‘labels and conclusions.’” (citing Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 566 U.S. 662, 678 (2009))).
174

Animal Sci. Prods. v. China Nat’l Metals & Minerals Imp. & Exp. Corp., 702 F. Supp.
2d 320, 334 n.6 (D.N.J. 2010).
175

Extensive factfinding was needed to address the question the district court attempted to
resolve, but, following the example of Iqbal, the court refused to expand the evidentiary
record. Jurisdictional discovery might also have done the job, but a better solution was found
by the circuit court, which followed Arbaugh. The appeals court held that this issue was in
fact not jurisdictional at all. This holding meant that the survival of the lawsuit could be
addressed in a simpler way on remand. Animal Sci. Prods. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654
F.3d 462, 469-70 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Unmoored from the question of subject matter jurisdiction,
[conformity with the statute] becomes just one additional merits issue . . . . [T]he District
Court may exercise its discretion ultimately to resolve this matter through other means, for
example, by deciding the defendants’ original motions to compel arbitration.”).
176

Animal Sci. Prods. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462, 465-68 (3d Cir. 2011)
(citing Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515-16); see also Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 657 F.3d 650,
659 (7th Cir. 2011) (strongly suggesting, but not reaching until “another day,” the conclusion
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remand the court would be deciding a 12(b)(6) motion, not a 12(b)(1) motion, and no
fact finding before discovery would be required. In remedial fashion, the circuit
court explained why this distinction matters practically:
We catalogue just two of the significant differences between these two
motions and how they may apply on remand in this case: First, the burden
in a Rule 12(b)(1) motion rests with the plaintiff, who must establish [in a
factual challenge] that there is subject matter jurisdiction; by contrast, the
defendant carries the burden in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Accordingly, the
burden on remand would no longer rest with the plaintiffs, but with the
defendants. Second, while a court generally looks only to the face of the
plaintiff’s complaint, must accept all alleged facts to be true, and is not
permitted to make independent findings of fact when deciding a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, a court may examine evidence and resolve factual
disputes on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion. . . . It would . . . be inappropriate for
the District Court, on remand, to assess independently the credibility of
allegations asserted by plaintiff’s expert witness.177
In applying Iqbal outside its proper context, the district court in Animal Science
had given plaintiffs both the detriment of a factual 12(b)(1) analysis, in which no
presumption of truth attaches to the complaint’s allegations, and the detriment of a
12(b)(6) analysis, in which contested legal conclusions are ignored rather than
resolved. The result was an overly skeptical reading of the complaint. In the circuit
court, on the other hand, the guidance of Arbaugh led to clarity on the doctrine.
Without such clarity, as the circuit court recognized,178 Iqbal disrupts jurisdictional
analysis and causes problems the Supreme Court never intended.
The same mistake was made in the personal-jurisdiction context by a Maryland
District Court in 2011, although this time the court carefully explained its reasoning:
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal did not specifically
address the pleading requirements for jurisdiction, and the issue has not
been resolved by the Fourth Circuit. . . . [But] similar language is used in
Rule 8 to describe the requirements for pleading both claims in a
complaint and the grounds for jurisdiction. . . . Indeed, it would be highly
incongruous to require separate pleading standards for two subsections of
the same rule. Moreover, the factual nature of the claims surrounding the
grounds for jurisdiction are, more often than not, intertwined with the
factual allegations showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. As such,
this Court concludes that the pleading standards articulated in Twombly
and Iqbal apply to Rule 8(a)(1).179

that Arbaugh and Morrison would require the same doctrinal change in antitrust law in that
circuit); Carrier Corp. v. Outukumpo Oyj, 673 F.3d 430, 439 n.4 (6th Cir. 2012) (same).
177

Animal Sci., 654 F. 3d at 470 n.9 (citatons omitted).

178

Id. at 470.

179

Haley Paint Co. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., No. RDB-10-0318, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 34925, at *20-22 (D. Md. Mar. 31, 2011). This holding is now the governing law in
the District of Maryland for challenges to personal jurisdiction. See Mykey Tech., Inc. v.
TEFKAT LLC, No. 12-cv-01468, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110122 (D. Md. Aug. 7, 2012);
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As it turned out, since it refused to order jurisdictional discovery, the court had to
revisit this ruling in light of new facts fifteen months later, after further evidence
emerged in discovery on related claims.180 In any event, its failure to consult
Supreme Court doctrine on the stark difference between jurisdiction and merits led it
to the wrong outcome as a matter of doctrine.181
F. The Special Case of Jurisdictional Statutes:
Stating a Claim Under the Alien Torts Statute
To be sure, the errors involved in Zanders, Animal Science, and Haley Paint are
not always based on a misreading of Iqbal’s aims; such procedural miscues can also
be motivated by the same legitimate policy concerns that motivated Iqbal. The
Eleventh Circuit, for example, has seized on the Iqbal plausibility standard as part of
its jurisprudence on 12(b)(1) issues in international human-rights cases. The
statutory authority for such charges in federal court, the Alien Tort Statute, is often
read to confer jurisdiction to U.S. courts only if the crime alleged is a clear and
definite element of international law,182 in the way piracy was in 1789 when the
statute was passed.183 Thus evaluating the legal sufficiency of claims under the

C.R. Daniels, Inc. v. Naztec Intern. Grp., LLC, No. 11-01624, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138871,
at *10 (D. Md. Dec. 2, 2011).
180

Haley Paint Co. v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., No. RDB-10-0318, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 46875, at *14 (D. Md. Apr. 3, 2012).
181
Another Maryland District Court recently replicated this mistake in the context of
subject-matter jurisdiction, although it did not affect the outcome. The court found that the
complaint satisfied Iqbal because it mentioned that the fax number used in the case was of the
kind used in mass-marketing campaigns:

Brey has alleged sufficient facts to support the $5 million amount-incontroversy requirement [for diversity jurisdiction under the Class
Action Fairness Act]. Brey avers that LQ sent “unsolicited facsimile
advertisements to tens of thousands of consumers” over “the past four
years” and has put forth enough facts to show that such allegations are
plausible. This is all that the Iqbal and Twombly pleading standard
requires.
Brey Corp. v. LQ Mgmt. LLC, No. AW-11-cv-00718, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125903, at *8
(D. Md. Nov. 1, 2011) (emphasis added).
182

See Richard J. Goldstone, International Jurisdiction and Prosecutorial Crimes, 47
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 473, 474 (1999) (“The origins of international jurisdiction [generally],
certainly in modern times, lie in the development of the concept of ‘crimes against
humanity.’”).
183
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732-33 (2004). Even though the statute only
confers jurisdiction, whether its applicability in a given case is truly a jurisdictional matter is a
matter of considerable disagreement. See Shepherd, supra note 8, at 2327 n.72 (“[T]he Sosa
Court never explicitly stated whether it was dismissing the claims based on lack of jurisdiction
or for failure to state a claim for relief.”). See generally Roe v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F.
Supp. 2d 988, 1002 (S.D. Ind. 2007) (explaining the conundrum, and persuasively rejecting “a
standard that blurs the line between subject matter jurisdiction and the sufficiency of a claim
on the merits”) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) and Bell
v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946)). Roe shows persuasively that the better approach is to
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Alien Tort Statute arguably implicates a federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction,
and vice versa.184 Many circuits, including the Eleventh, regard as jurisdictional the
issue of what crimes are included.185 This in turn makes Rule 12(b)(1) the proper
framework; nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit has established that its courts should
apply Iqbal to determination of these questions.186
In the leading Eleventh Circuit case, a U.S. corporation was allegedly in league,
through its local affiliate, with Colombian paramilitary forces that violently
suppressed union activity.187 The circuit court affirmed the finding that the
complaint “fell short of pleading the factual allegations necessary to invoke the
court’s subject matter jurisdiction under the [Alien Tort Statute].”188 As in Iqbal, the
court held that plaintiffs had “insufficiently pled a conspiracy,” this one “between
the local facilities’ management and the paramilitary officers.”189 Unlike in Iqbal,
though, the court held that this insufficiency in the pleadings (along with inadequate
allegations of state action) not only canceled the lawsuit but actually divested the
court of its power to hear the case. The introduction of Iqbal was straightforward:
the court cited recent circuit precedent for the proposition that in “a Rule 12(b)(1)
facial challenge a plaintiff has ‘safeguards similar to those retained when a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is raised.’”190 This outdated

assume jurisdiction, then treat issues about international norms under Rule 12(b)(6). See
Shepherd, supra note 8, at 2328-29 (favorably describing Roe).
184

The same is true in evaluating whether the Federal Tort Claims Act has been
successfully invoked. 28 U.S.C.S. § 1346(b) (LexisNexis 2010) (United States’ sovereign
immunity is waived only “under circumstances where the United States, if a private person,
would be liable to the claimant.”). The statute arguably confers jurisdiction only if the tort
claim is successful on the merits. Hence any element of the claim could arguably be contested
in a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Erin M. Watkins, The Scope
of Employment Requirement of the Federal Tort Claims Act: The Impropriety and
Implications of the Monez Decision, and the Superior Jurisdictional Prima Facie Approach,
17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 533, 534 (describing circuit split as to 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6) status of
the FTCA defense that federal employee’s tortious act was not embraced by the jurisdictional
statute, because committed outside the scope of employment).
185
Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260–61 (11th Cir. 2009); cf. Sarei v. Rio
Tinto PLC, 650 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1021 n.44 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (“[T]he initial jurisdictional
inquiry in an [Alien Tort Claims Act] case does not evaluate whether the cause of action will
turn out to be well founded in law and fact.”) (quoting Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d
1193, 1200 (9th Cir. 2007) (in turn citing Bell, 327 U.S. at 682-83)).
186

See Shepherd, supra note 8, at 2341-44 (describing the approach of the Sinaltrainal
court, in contrast to the Second Circuit, and showing that prior Eleventh Circuit approaches to
Alien Tort Statute cases underlie its readiness to apply Iqbal to jurisdictional disputes in such
cases).
187

Sinaltrainal, 578 F.3d at 1260–61.

188

Id.

189

Id.

190

Id. at 1260 (quoting McElmurray v. Consol. Gov’t of Augusta-Richmond Cnty., 501
F.3d 1244, 1251 (11th Cir. 2007)).
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cross-reference in turn activated Iqbal, and required plausibility of the plaintiffs’
claims.191
The conspiracy allegations in Sinaltrainal invite comparisons with Iqbal itself,
and its holding can be defended as another instance of identifying plaintiff’s failure
to plead plausible facts adequate to activate a federal statute. The only difference is
that the statute happened to be one that operates solely to confer jurisdiction.192
Though the substantive outcome is defensible by analogy to Iqbal, the case’s
citations on procedure do not support its approach. The court was correct to note
that recent circuit precedent stated that facial 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) plaintiff
safeguards are similar—and that precedent postdated Twombly. But the precedent
went on to explain clearly that in a facial challenge, the court was authorized
“merely to look and see if [the] plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject
matter jurisdiction . . . [T]he allegations in his complaint are taken as true for the
purposes of the motion.”193 It admonished, moreover, that if the challenge disputes
the alleged jurisdictional facts, “the district court must give the plaintiff an
opportunity for discovery and for a hearing that is appropriate to the nature of the
motion to dismiss.”194 This would seem to foreclose the 12(b)(1) approach taken in
Sinaltrainal. Moreover, tracing back any of the citations in that 2007 precedent
leads the student of civil procedure to Bell v. Hood, the pathbreaking Supreme Court
decision distinguishing between 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) motions.195
In the context of the Alien Tort Statute, other circuits have taken a different
approach than the Eleventh for a variety of reasons.196 It seems indisputable, though,
191

See Shepherd, supra note 8, at 2342 (showing how the outcome of Sinaltrainal hinged
on application of the plausibility standard); see also Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163,
172 n.6 (2d Cir. 2009) (reviewing under the Twombly standard lower court’s hybrid
determination “that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiffs failed to state claims
under the ATS”).
192
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004) (Alien Tort Statute as “only
jurisdictional”); see also Olivier Plantation, LLC v. St. Bernard Parish, 744 F. Supp. 2d 575,
582 (E.D. La. 2010) (in the context of a different jurisdictional statute, the Federal Tort
Claims Act, granting 12(b)(1) motion under Iqbal standard because plaintiff landowners’
claims did not establish jurisdiction to access federal court to redress emergency actions taken
after Hurricane Katrina).
193
McElmurray, 501 F.3d at 1251 (quoting Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529
(11th Cir. 1990)).
194

Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 414 (5th Cir.
1981)).
195

See Lawrence, 919 F.2d at 1529 (citing Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d
507, 511 (5th Cir. 1980) and Williamson, 645 F.2d at 413 (“It is elementary that a district
court has broader power to decide its own right to hear the case than it has when the merits of
the case are reached.”) (citing Menchaca, 613 F.2d at 516)); Menchaca, 613 F.2d at 516 (case
should be dismissed for want of subject-matter jurisdiction “only if the federal claims are
‘wholly insubstantial or frivolous’”) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946)).
196

See Al-Quraishi v. Nakhla, 728 F. Supp. 2d 702, 716-17, 735 (D. Md. 2010) (using
different standards for jurisdiction and merits, and concluding, for example, that before
discovery “it is clearly too early to dismiss Defendants on the basis of derivative sovereign
immunity”) (citing Schrader v. Hercules, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 159, 161 (W.D. Va. 1980)), rev’d
on other grounds sub nom. Al-Quraishi v. L-3 Servs., Inc., 657 F.3d 201, 205 (4th Cir. 2011)

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2012

37

836

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:799

that no longstanding precedent or policy justifies the Eleventh Circuit procedure of
applying Iqbal to jurisdictional questions as a matter of course. It is true that
Sinaltrainal bears some resemblance to Iqbal, and can be justified with some of the
Twombly policy rationales for dispensing with the case before discovery. In
addition, it raises issues of international diplomacy that counsel caution. But the
doctrinal foundation of the Sinaltrainal approach is tenuous.
G. The Special Case of Jurisdictional Elements in the Cause of Action:
Pleading Interstate Commerce
Reading the complaint skeptically in all its aspects, as Iqbal seems to encourage,
leads to early jurisdictional dismissals of suspect reliability. One instructive instance
of the error of disavowing jurisdiction under Iqbal occurred in the Southern District
of Mississippi in 2010, in a suit alleging anticompetitive conduct in price quotes for
rounds of golf.197 Before addressing the substance of Sherman Act unfaircompetition claims, courts have to determine as a factual matter whether interstate
commerce is involved, because if not, subject-matter jurisdiction is lacking.198 It
would be unconstitutional to apply the Congressional statute if the case involved
purely local commerce, outside Congress’s power to regulate. Atypically, this
threshold inquiry is required not only to test the claim’s legal sufficiency, but also to
test whether adjudicating the claim is within the scope of federal power.199 The
upshot of this quirk in the Sherman Act is that the dispositive motion in the
Mississippi case, Gulf Coast, tested whether the court had subject-matter
jurisdiction.200 Under this procedural posture, the plaintiffs should have been
(“we have accepted as true the plaintiffs’ allegations that the defendants engaged in a
conspiracy with military personnel to torture them, abuse them, and cover up those actions”);
see also Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (analyzing viability of
Alien Torts Statute claim solely under Rule 12(b)(6), without questioning subject-matter
jurisdiction); Chowdhury v. Worldtel Bangladesh Holding, 588 F. Supp. 2d 375, 379
(E.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting in a discussion of Twombly’s applicability “the very substantial issue,
one that has recently divided a panel of the Second Circuit, as to whether there are separate
tests for analyzing subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim under the [Alien
Torts Statute]”) (citing Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007)
(per curiam)).
197

Gulf Coast Hotel-Motel Ass’n v. Miss. Gulf Coast Golf Course Ass’n, No.
1:08CV1430, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81211, at *4 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 10, 2010).
198
McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232, 242 (1980) (“[J]urisdiction may not be
invoked under [the Sherman Act] unless the relevant aspect of interstate commerce is
identified; it is not sufficient merely to rely on identification of a relevant local activity and to
presume an interrelationship with some unspecified aspect of interstate commerce.”); cf.
Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits, 80 WASH. L. REV. 643, 660-61
(contending that “jurisdictional elements” like effect on interstate commerce should be
handled in 12(b)(6) motions, as they establish an aspect of the claim).
199

McLain, 444 U.S. at 242; see also Mortensen, v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d
884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977) (“That the same phrase [in the Sherman Act, ‘commerce among the
several States,’] is both an element of the offense and a vital prerequisite for federal court
jurisdiction has caused considerable confusion.”).
200

See generally Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891 (finding dubious “the propriety of dismissing
Sherman Act claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction at a pretrial stage when relevant
facts are in dispute, and relevant discovery has not been completed”).
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required only to satisfy Rule 8(a)(1), by giving a “short and plain statement of the
grounds for the court’s jurisdiction,” and if facts were in question the court should
have undertaken jurisdictional discovery.
None of the rationales of Iqbal applied to this jurisdictional issue, since no
expensive discovery or disruptive depositions of high-level officials would be
required to determine whether the greens fees charged to plaintiffs’ customers had
interstate effects. The court just had to satisfy itself that the golf controversy was
not purely local, like a child’s lemonade stand. If it were, the issue would be outside
Congress’s power to regulate, and hence outside the court’s power to adjudicate.
Moreover, as a policy matter, the threshold plausibility under Iqbal should not have
been the issue: the interstate quality of the commerce in such a case defines the type
of case in question, not the merits of the specific claim.201 Hence the legal
sufficiency of the complaint should have been tested under Conley, or its factual
sufficiency tested using the court’s own fact-finding powers. 202
Instead, the district court applied the Iqbal test and found that it lacked
jurisdiction.
The complaint’s relevant paragraphs, it said, “contain purely
conclusory allegations as to the purported impact of Defendants’ conduct on
interstate commerce.”203 Assertions in subsequent briefs—specifically, “that the vast
majority, if not all, of the customers who purchase these vouchers are out of state
customers”—were ignored as the court focused on the four corners of the
complaint.204 As a result, the plaintiffs had ostensibly failed to “make the requisite
showing that the activities in question were sufficiently in interstate commerce” to
establish federal-court jurisdiction.205 But neither Supreme Court precedent on the
Sherman Act206 nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require the complaint to
make a particularized showing to defeat a 12(b)(1) motion: a preliminary showing in
201

McLain, 444 U.S. at 243 (“Even where there is an inability to prove that concerted
activity has resulted in legally cognizable damages, jurisdiction need not be impaired.”).
202
See, e.g., Jessie v. Potter, 516 F.3d 709, 712 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting that a Rule 12(b)(1)
ruling may resolve disputed facts, while a 12(b)(6) dismissal must be decided on the
pleadings); see also McLain, 444 U.S. at 246 (“Th[e] [lenient Conley] rule applies with no less
force to a Sherman Act claim, where one of the requisites of a cause of action is the existence
of a demonstrable nexus between the defendants’ activity and interstate commerce.” (quoting
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); see also id. at 243 (specifying that this is a
“jurisdictional element”); Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 892 (suggesting that because the interstatecommerce test is so closely entwined with the merits, in factual 12(b)(1) challenges under the
Sherman Act “we feel it is incumbent upon the trial judge to demand less in the way of
jurisdictional proof than would be appropriate at a trial stage”).
203

Gulf Coast Hotel-Motel Ass’n v. Miss. Gulf Coast Golf Course Ass’n, No.
1:08CV1430, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81211, at *16 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009)).
204

Id. at *18, *21. The court pointed out that authorities suggesting otherwise predated
Twombly.
205

Id. at *16-17 (emphasis added).

206

McLain, 444 U.S. at 242-43 (“to establish jurisdiction a plaintiff must allege the critical
relationship in the pleadings[,] and if these allegations are controverted must proceed to
demonstrate by submission of evidence beyond the pleadings” that the commerce is interstate)
(emphasis added).
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the complaint is needed on the substance of a claim, not to establish jurisdiction.
Rule 8(a)(1) requires only a statement of the grounds for a court’s jurisdiction.
In Gulf Coast, the district court should have acknowledged and credited the
allegation that the plaintiff hotels were involved in interstate commerce (unless it
was obviously “completely devoid of merit”207). If the fact was contested by the
defendants, the court should have permitted thorough jurisdictional discovery, or
held hearings later, to resolve the question as a matter of fact.208 Instead the decision
was based only on serially amended complaints.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s holding on jurisdiction,
and remanded. Unfortunately, it did so not by correcting the standard of review but
by reading the complaint more attentively under the wrong standard.209 Since the
plaintiffs had alleged that out-of-state golfers came to the resort, the circuit court
held that they had shown enough factual matter to satisfy Iqbal.210 Even though the
issue at hand was jurisdictional, the circuit court believed that the analysis had to be
adjusted for Iqbal. Disagreeing with the district court, it found that the complaint
was adequate under the heightened pleading standard.211 But the opinion implied212
that absent a passing reference to out-of-state golfers, it might have found a lack of

207

Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Cnty. of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 667 (1974).

208
See, e.g., Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527,
537-38 (1995) (“Normal practice permits a party to establish jurisdiction at the outset of a case
by means of a nonfrivolous assertion of jurisdictional elements, and any litigation of a
contested subject-matter jurisdictional fact issue occurs in comparatively summary procedure
before a judge alone.”) (citations omitted); cf. Montez v. Dep’t of Navy, 392 F.3d 147, 150
(5th Cir. 2004) (“[W]here issues of fact are central both to subject matter jurisdiction and the
claim on the merits, we have held that the trial court must assume jurisdiction and proceed to
the merits.”).
209
The trickiness of the distinction between jurisdiction and merits in this scenario has a
long history: in 1976, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the issues overlapped in Sherman
Act cases, but noted that “our analysis in this case would be no different” as between 12(b)(1)
and 12(b)(6) analyses. Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 742 n.1 (1976)
(“In either event, the critical inquiry is into the adequacy of the nexus between respondents’
conduct and interstate commerce that is alleged in the complaint.”). After Twombly, it is no
longer the case that the two analyses are procedurally identical.
210

Gulf Coast Hotel-Motel Ass’n v. Miss. Gulf Coast Golf Course Ass’n, 658 F.3d 500,
506 (5th Cir. 2011).
211

Id. at 506 n.3 (“No party here argues that Summit Health is no longer good law in light
of Twombly or Iqbal. Indeed, at least one of our sister circuits has recently relied on Summit
Health.”) (citing Yakima Valley Mem. Hosp. v. State Dep’t of Health, 654 F.3d 919 (9th Cir.
2011)) (citing Summit Health, Ltd. V. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322 (1991) (establishing the threshold
test for such claims)). But see Yakima Valley, 654 F.3d at 924, 932 (addressing whether
complaint stated a claim under 12(b)(6), not jurisdiction under 12(b)(1), and not invoking
Iqbal in section on the jurisdictional issue of standing) (citing City of Los Angeles v. Cnty. of
Kern, 581 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 2009) (jurisdictional issue of standing addressed without
reference to Twombly or Iqbal)).
212
Gulf Coast, 658 F.3d at 506 (noting that “the allegations in this complaint that the Golf
Association’s anticompetitive acts ‘substantially affected interstate commerce’ [would] not
[be] sufficient on their own” to establish jurisdiction after Iqbal).
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jurisdiction from the face of the complaint, even though significant case law 213
suggested it should draw the contrary inference in the case of a golf resort. It gave
no indication that further jurisdictional discovery might have been appropriate.
In the end, nothing turned on the pleading standard in Gulf Coast, since the
circuit court found that the complaint satisfied either standard, and the lower court
might have reached the same result by applying the Sherman Act requirement
without framing it in jurisdictional terms. In applying Iqbal to focus on the
complaint alone, though, both courts regarded jurisdiction and statement of a claim
as the same category of requirement, in defiance of the Arbaugh line of cases.214 To
be sure, the procedural error here arose in part from the confusing double-status of
the required nexus with interstate commerce, which is a “jurisdictional element” of a
Sherman Act claim. Nonetheless, Gulf Coast stands in the Fifth Circuit for the
erroneous proposition that Iqbal requires a complaint to show, not just to state, the
grounds for subject-matter jurisdiction.215 Accordingly it suggests, erroneously, that
a jurisdictional statement is to be read with the same skepticism the Twombly court
applied to statements of the merits of a claim.
IV. THE ERROR ENTRENCHED
The error of applying Iqbal to jurisdictional questions propagates through the
federal court system in two different ways. The first has to do with the way courts
read Iqbal itself, and sometimes take it to authorize more skeptical reading of
complaints regardless of the procedural posture of the case. This error was
exemplified in Haley Paint, where the district court tackled the issue as a matter of
“first impression,” and compared Rules 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(2) without noticing that the
latter requires the plaintiff to “show” something, while the former requires only a

213
See id. (citing cases about hotels and summer camps for the principle that “[e]ven when
business activities are purely local, if it is interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does not
matter how local the operation which applies the squeeze”) (quoting Camps
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Me., 520 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1997)).
214

See id. at 507 (mingling 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) terminology by holding that the
complaint “states a claim with respect to subject matter jurisdiction”). The error is
particularly notable in both courts in light of the fact that the district court cites Arbaugh as
part of its boilerplate on subject-matter jurisdiction. Gulf Coast Hotel-Motel Ass’n v. Miss.
Gulf Coast Golf Course Ass’n, No. 1:08CV1430, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81211, at *9.
215

See also Castro v. United States, 560 F.3d 381, 386 (5th Cir. 2009) (Rule 12(b)(1)
motion should be granted only “if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove a plausible
set of facts that establish subject-matter jurisdiction” (emphasis added)), vacated, 608 F.3d
266, 268 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (indicating that ruling applies the
same standard: “[t]he majority acknowledges that we have before us a Rule 12(b)(1)
dismissal, but it erroneously concludes that Castro has not met her burden under Twombly and
Iqbal”); Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 566 (5th Cir. 2008) (evaluating only “plausible
set[s] of facts” consistent with the complaint to determine subject-matter jurisdiction) (citing
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). But cf. Adapt v. Cnty. of El Paso,
No. EP-10-CV-307-PRM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98113, at *11 (W.D. Tex. May 17, 2011)
(refusing to convert a 12(b)(1) motion to a 12(b)(6) motion, to address substance of motion to
dismiss, because defendant had wrongly “cite[d] to Twombly in the same paragraph in which
it argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction”).
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“statement.”216 Similarly, the improvisations of the Animal Science court resulted
from the novelty of Iqbal. As circuit courts absorb Iqbal into binding precedents,
though, such errors will become less common.
The second kind of error propagation, though, is considerably more difficult to
prevent. It results from one of the strengths of the common-law system: the fact
that district courts generally do not improvise, but draw on previous rulings in order
to describe the rules and the procedures for following them. As we have seen, this
means that the standard rule of thumb equating factual approaches to 12(b)(6) and
facial 12(b)(1) analyses has often been restated and re-applied, even after it has
ceased to be correct. Worse yet, it means that an error in a circuit-court analysis gets
transplanted, like a virus, into contexts where it can have much larger effects.
A. Erroneous Application of the Iqbal Pleading Standard Increasingly Disrupts
Jurisprudence on Standing
In the Eighth Circuit, analysis of plaintiff’s standing to sue has on several
occasions deployed the Iqbal standard. The Zanders case described above has been
cited dozens of times, and in one case its formulation of the “nudged across the line”
Twombly standard for plausibility was re-quoted and applied three times for
jurisdictional questions.217 But Zanders itself seemed sound even to the careful law
clerk: it had drawn on unquestioned circuit precedent. In a 2007 case, a panel of the
Eighth Circuit had, in passing, endorsed the use of Iqbal in determining standing.
[Since] the district court addressed a deficiency in the pleadings, our
standard of review is the same standard we apply in Rule 12(b)(6) cases.
We accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint, giving no effect
to conclusory allegations of law. The plaintiff must assert facts that
affirmatively and plausibly suggest that the pleader has the right he claims
(here, the right to jurisdiction), rather than facts that are merely consistent
with such a right.218
In this case, Stalley v. Catholic Health Initiatives, the plaintiff was a lawyer who
claimed for himself the right to pursue private insurers who failed to reimburse
Medicare for expenses caused by their customers’ own malpractice. There was a
statutory basis for this argument, but the statute assigned the right to the patients
themselves, not to third parties. Lacking an injury-in-fact or any artificial qui tam
standing,219 the lawyer was sent away empty-handed after straightforward statutory
216

Haley Paint Co. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., No. RDB-10-0318, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 34925, at *21 (D. Md. Mar. 31, 2011).
217

Farm-To-Consumer Legal Def. Fund v. Sebelius, 734 F. Supp. 2d 668, 686, 688, 690
(N.D. Iowa 2010).
218
Stalley v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 509 F.3d 517, 521 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Mattes v.
ABC Plastics, Inc., 323 F.3d 695, 697-98 (8th Cir. 2003) and Twombly, 550 U.S. at 553-56)
(emphasis added).
219

In a qui tam action the party filing the complaint lacks actual standing to bring the case,
and therefore is called the relator (or “informer”) rather than the plaintiff. The action is
constitutional because there is a “case or controversy” between the government and the
defendant. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 120 (1968) (citing Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212,
225 (1905)); United States ex rel. Hall v. Tribal Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d 1208, 1213 (7th Cir.
1995) (“it is the government, not the individual relator, who is the real plaintiff in the suit”).
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analysis.220 Nothing in the case hinged on the matter of plausibility. Nonetheless,
the new boilerplate for the Eighth Circuit had now been written (replacing the preTwombly case Mattes, which was cited for the equivalence between 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6) approaches). In four years, Stalley has been cited thirty-four times by
district courts in the Eighth Circuit for cases involving subject-matter jurisdiction.221
Hence, instead of simply reading the Zanders case in order to understand the
rationale applying Iqbal standards to the jurisdictional question of injury-in-fact, a
clerk (or attorney) must read at least three other cases: Stalley, Mattes, and Iqbal.
Without the awareness of the doctrinal niceties, even then such a clerk is unlikely to
see any problem with Stalley’s formulation of the test for jurisdiction. The
excellence of the automatized Federal Rules, which are applied uniformly by
ongoing citations from precedent to precedent, becomes a weakness in such a
scenario. The Stalley court’s incautious handling of the standard of review set an
error propagating rapidly: in two years, Eighth Circuit district courts have now in
turn cited Zanders for the approach to jurisdictional questions no less than thirty-five
times.222
220
Many courts might have considered the Stalley dismissal a matter of “prudential,” or
“statutory,” standing, since it hinged on whether “the legal rights of third parties” created by a
federal law “implie[d] a right of action in the plaintiff.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501
(1975); see also Tribal Dev., 49 F.3d at 1215 (observing that the Eighth Circuit atypically
regards applicability of a qui tam statute as a matter of prudential standing) (citing Schmit v.
Int’l Fin. Mgmt. Co., 980 F.2d 498, 498 (8th Cir. 1992) (per curiam)).

In the Eighth Circuit, atypically, prudential standing is considered a jurisdictional bar: it is
raised on a 12(b)(1) motion and can even be challenged in the appeals court after not being
raised at trial. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dep’t of the Interior, No. 11-1745, 2012 U.S. App.
LEXIS 597, at *9, *11 (8th Cir. Jan. 11, 2012) (dismissing case in response to a prudentialstanding argument raised “for the first time on appeal”). This allowed the Stalley ruling on
prudential standing to set Eighth Circuit precedent for all subject-matter jurisdiction analyses.
Cf. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004) (prudential standing
concerns can lead the court to refrain from hearing a suit “[e]ven in cases concededly within
[its] jurisdiction”).
221

In addition, the Second Circuit has used Stalley to support a tenuous reading of its own
precedent that apparently required plausible pleadings to establish standing:
[T]o survive [the] Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, Amidax must allege facts that
affirmatively and plausibly suggest that it has standing to sue [citing Selevan v. N. Y.
Thruway Auth., 584 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 2009), and Stalley, 509 F.3d at 521] . . . .
What is missing [in the complaint] is factual support for Amidax’s allegation that
SWIFT handed over Amidax’s financial information to the government. Only if such
factual support exists can Amidax nudge its alleged injury from one that is
conceivable to one that is plausible.
Amidax Trading Grp. v. S.W.I.F.T. SCRL, No. 09-3293-cv, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 25074, at
*9, *13 (2d Cir. Dec. 19, 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680 (2009)). This
was both an erroneous standard and a misreading of Selevan. As observed supra note 166, the
Selevan court had not used the Iqbal standard for Article III standing, but for prudential
standing. In the Second Circuit, prudential standing is not a jurisdictional matter. Arar v.
Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 172 (2d Cir. 2008) (“prudential standing [is] the sort of ‘threshold
question . . . [that] may be resolved before addressing jurisdiction’”) (quoting Tenet v. Doe,
544 U.S. 1, 6-7 n.4 (2005)).
222

Shepard’s “restrict by headnote” search conducted December 28, 2011.
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Leniency in jurisdictional pleading standards does not constitute overall leniency
in assuming jurisdiction. In the leading recent Supreme Court case on standing, a
conservative five-judge majority carried out a significant tightening of the
requirements for constitutional standing.223 Finding a lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction both factually and facially, the Court dismissed a plaintiff’s action
despite a congressionally created cause of action in an environmental law.224 Even
here, however, the Court made clear that adverse jurisdictional rulings must not
occur on a slender factual record. If a court is to be divested of its power to hear a
case, it may not do so merely on the basis of a scanty complaint: “At the pleading
stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct
may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we presume that general allegations embrace
those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.”225 This premise of the
standing analysis under Rule 8(a)(1) is incompatible with the new Rule 8(a)(2) Iqbal
pleading standard; the two should not be conflated. Even when extending minimal
generosity toward plaintiffs, as in Lujan, the Supreme Court still insists that
jurisdictional pleadings be read leniently.
B. Erroneous Application of the Iqbal Pleading Standard
Creates Unreasonable Outcomes
Other circuits have done better than the Eighth at keeping distinct the standards
for 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) analyses. But even in the circuits that have been most clear
on the topic, small mistakes are quickly reproduced and magnified. For example, in
September 2009, a panel of the Ninth Circuit mentioned in passing that it was
applying Iqbal to determine whether jurisdiction had been established against the
Kingdom of Spain, to overcome its sovereign immunity.226 Although this standard
had no effect on the analysis, and although an en banc panel revisited the decision
and made no mention of Iqbal,227 one district court had already picked up on the
error and replicated it.228 That district-court ruling, Sustainable Delta, applied Iqbal
223
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992); cf. id. at 579 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“I am not willing to foreclose the possibility, however, that in
different circumstances a nexus theory similar to those proffered here might support a claim to
standing.”).
224
Id. at 576 (public interest cannot “be converted into an individual right by a statute that
denominates it as such”).
225

Id. at 561 (contrasting this standard with the standard of review at the summaryjudgment stage).
226

Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 580 F.3d 1048, 1052 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

227

Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 616 F.3d 1019, 1022 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(noting simply that “we take the facts as alleged in the complaint as true because we are
reviewing a denial of a motion to dismiss” (citing Altmann v. Rep. of Austria, 317 F.3d 954,
961-62 (9th Cir. 2002))).
228

Coal. for a Sustainable Delta v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 711 F. Supp. 2d 1152,
1158 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (“The standards used to resolve motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)
are relevant to disposition of a facial attack under 12(b)(1).”) (citing Cassirer, 580 F.3d at
1052 n.2); see also id. at 1159 n.2 (noting that the previous circuit standard for rulings on
standing, requiring only “general factual allegations,” had been “issued before the Supreme
Court’s paradigm-shifting ruling in Iqbal”).
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to a jurisdictional analysis, and was cited in turn in January 2011 in a brief in the
Northern District of California in Coalition for ICANN Transparency v. VeriSign,
Inc., an antitrust case already well into its fifth year.
The initial dismissal on the merits in ICANN229 had been overturned by the Ninth
Circuit on appeal,230 and the case was remanded for re-pleading and discovery. But
the defendants now contended that the plaintiffs lacked standing, and had not
conformed their allegations of standing to Iqbal and Twombly.231 Although standing
is jurisdictional, and therefore should not be affected by Iqbal scrutiny, the court was
persuaded by the brief: it examined the allegations of standing and found that the
revised complaint “fail[ed] to allege facts showing that [plaintiff’s injured members]
were financial supporters or members at the time the complaint was filed in
2005.”232 Hence, the plaintiffs had not alleged standing except in a conclusory
fashion. This should have satisfied Rule 8(a)(1), but the court found it lacking by
the Iqbal Rule 8(a)(2) standard.
While dismissing one component of the claim on the merits again, the ICANN
court disposed of the bulk of the case a second time around for jurisdictional
reasons, even though the circuit court had remanded the case to be heard. Thus
Iqbal, working its way into the analysis through dicta in a little-known previous
ruling, allowed the district court on remand to dispose of the case yet again because
the complaint had listed the plaintiff’s member organizations incorrectly.233 The
case settled in May, 2011, after 333 docket entries.234
It is certainly possible that the second ICANN dismissal was correct. If the
plaintiff had replaced constituent organizations during the course of the litigation,
and now was relying on different antitrust injuries than the litigation had begun with,
that would raise a legitimate standing problem. But instead of ordering its own
229

Coal. for ICANN Transparency Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 2d 948, 965 (N.D.
Cal. 2006).
230
Coal. for ICANN Transparency, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 567 F.3d 1084, 1096 (9th Cir.
2009) (finding two out of three claims adequately stated, and failing to acknowledge Twombly
precedent on adequacy of pleadings in antitrust cases), reprinted as amended at 611 F.3d 495,
509 (9th Cir. 2010) (reaching same result using Twombly terminology, and reminding district
court to expect third revised complaint to be amended to satisfy Twombly and Iqbal).
231

Reply Memorandum of Defendant Verisign, Inc. in Support of Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff Coalition for ICANN Transparency, Inc.’s Third Amended Complaint, No. 05-cv04826-RMW, 2011 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 1238, at *10-11 (Jan. 21, 2011)
(contending that in the amended complaint the plaintiff “ignore[s] its pleading obligations
under Iqbal/Twombly and the standard for demonstrating standing under federal law”).
232
Coal. for ICANN Transparency Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 771 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1200
(N.D. Cal. 2011) (emphasis added).
233

Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Verisign, Inc.’s
Motion to Dismiss CFIT’s Third Amended Complaint, No. 05-cv-04826 RMW, 2011 U.S.
Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 1237, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2011) (“CFIT has disclosed, both in
discovery and in earlier filed pleadings, the names of members who satisfy the same standing
requirements as those who have withdrawn.”).
234
Order on Stipulation for Dismissal of Action Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 41(A) and for Retention of Jurisdiction over Action to Enforce Settlement, No. 05CV-04826 PACER/ECF No. 333, (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2011).
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discovery to satisfy itself as to its jurisdiction, the court used the heightened Iqbal
standard to disclaim its power to act, rather than resolving the factual dispute or
reaching the merits. This is the sort of outcome that sharp merits/jurisdiction
distinctions are meant to prevent.
C. Heightened Jurisdictional Pleading Standards Have
Significant Constitutional Implications
One consolation in light of this propagating error might be that these doctrinal
questions are theoretical, and unlikely to have an impact in any case of great national
moment. If a complaint is weakly pleaded and fails firmly to establish a case or
controversy to invoke jurisdiction, it seems unlikely that anything significant is at
stake for society. This consolation is unsustainable, however, in light of a Tennessee
district court’s 2010 decision in Shreeve v. Obama.235 The motion to dismiss the
lawsuit’s challenge to the constitutionality of the 2010 Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act hinged on whether the plaintiffs had standing to bring the case
before the law’s individual mandate to buy health insurance took effect. The court
posited that the facial 12(b)(1) challenge about standing should lead it to “review the
motion similarly as it would a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,” and cited the Iqbal and
Twombly plausibility standards.236 Accordingly, it evaluated only “the complaint on
its face,”237 and declined to “consider facts [in responsive briefs] that could have
been pleaded in Plaintiffs’ original complaint and amended complaints.”238 Because
it found a lack of jurisdiction, the court “expresse[d] no opinion on the merits of
Plaintiffs’ or Defendants’ arguments regarding the constitutionality of the
[Affordable Care Act].”239
The prevalence and entrenched character of the jurisdictional Iqbal error raise
concerns that the Supreme Court takes seriously. If courts divest themselves of
power to hear cases, rather than reaching the merits, less is accomplished to resolve
difficult problems of law and policy. Litigation can drag on for many months before
a motion to dismiss is granted on jurisdictional grounds. Such resort to technicalities
to wash the court’s hands of a case may be a smaller problem than the problem of
protracted, expensive discovery addressed by Twombly, but it is a real problem
nonetheless. And it is a problem more fundamental to the U.S. system of justice.
The importance of procedural leniency in accepting jurisdiction was reaffirmed by
the Supreme Court in 2010, in a case that carried remarkable echoes of the original
affirmation of lenient pleading standards, Conley v. Gibson.
At the opening of its ruling in Union Pacific the Court quoted the first Supreme
Court Chief Justice:
235
Shreeve v. Obama, No. 1-10-CV-71, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118631 (E.D. Tenn. Nov.
4, 2010); cf. Peterson v. United States, 774 F. Supp. 2d 418, 421 (D.N.H. 2011) (using nonIqbal standards to evaluate jurisdictional pleadings of Medicare recipient seeking to challenge
Affordable Care Act (ACA)).
236
Shreeve, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118631, at *2; see also id. at *10 (holding that
“Plaintiffs’ complaint fails to plead sufficient facts to establish jurisdiction”).
237

Id. at *6.

238

Id. at *11 (ignoring allegation that certain healthcare providers were given an “unfair
competitive advantage” by ACA regulations on tanning salons).
239

Id. at *2.
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“It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not,”
Chief Justice Marshall famously wrote, “but it is equally true, that it must
take jurisdiction if it should. . . . We have no more right to decline the
exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not
given.”240
Like Conley, this case was about a dispute involving the employment conditions of
railway workers and the authority of the National Railway Adjustment Board. This
time, though, it was not a lower federal court, but the Board itself, that had divested
itself of jurisdiction to hear the case.241 It found, late in the proceedings, that the
parties had failed to state, in their filings with the Board, that they had attempted
arbitration as the rules required. There was no dispute that the arbitration had in fact
been attempted, but the parties had not said so up front. Determining that this
undermined, not the merits of the case, but the Board’s own jurisdiction, the panel
had canceled the proceedings and undone its own participation in the dispute.242
In Union Pacific, the Supreme Court delivered a forceful rebuke to this
maneuver, and in doing so reasserted its own authority to correct errors: “By
presuming authority to declare procedural rules [governing initial filings]
‘jurisdictional,’ the panel failed to conform, or confine itself, to matters [Congress
placed] within the scope of [NRAB] jurisdiction.”243 The Court reversed and
remanded. As in the lower courts in Conley, the Board’s cramped reading of the
initial filings had created an abrupt dismissal of a case for jurisdictional reasons.
The Supreme Court saw this as a betrayal of a tribunal’s duty to exercise its power
and decide cases.
Paradoxically, then, according to the Supreme Court, the Board had exceeded its
mandate by declining to hear a case. 244 The irony of exceeding power by renouncing
it, as the Board had done in Union Pacific and the lower courts had done in Conley,
should not be unfamiliar to students of constitutional law and civil procedure. It is,
after all, the way the Supreme Court gained the power of judicial review in the first
place.245 Rather than addressing the merits of Marbury v. Madison, a politically
untenable proposition, Chief Justice Marshall washed the Court’s hands of the case
by finding a lack of jurisdiction over it.246 The holding of this seminal case was
240

Union Pac. R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen Gen. Comm. of
Adjustment, 130 S. Ct. 584, 590 (2009) (citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821)).
241

Id.

242

Id.

243

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

244

Cf. Anthony Andricks, Note, Creating Diversity Jurisdiction in Removal Actions
through the Improper Use of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 21, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 249, 261-67 (2012)
(describing an instance of the more familiar concern: a court reinterpreting the rules to
expand its jurisdiction).
245

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803) (rejecting the proposition that “the power
remains to the legislature, to assign original jurisdiction to [the Supreme Court] in other cases
than those specified” by Article III).
246

Id. at 178 (holding unconstitutional the jurisdictional statute that enabled the case to be
brought).
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simply that the Supreme Court could not hear the case until it had been heard by a
lower court.247
In proclaiming its impotence, the Marbury Court ingeniously laid claim for
posterity to unforeseen strengths in the judiciary. Instead of attempting to match its
power of command with the executive branch, it struck down a jurisdictional grant
of Congress and pronounced predominant its own authority to determine what the
law is.248 Thus the Court greatly expanded the acknowledged breadth of its power
by leveraging a technicality of civil procedure. Such extensions of power are rarely
in the spirit of the Constitution, and achieving them through subterfuge is called for
only once in the life of a political system. When they forswear jurisdiction now
under Iqbal pleading standards, instead of following the Federal Rules, lower federal
courts improperly reenact this primal gesture of power.
V. CONCLUSION
It is now possible to see the value of the Supreme Court’s sustained attention to
the distinction between failure to state a claim and lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Until Iqbal, the issue was largely theoretical or academic, having few real-world
consequences. Since the standards of review for each motion were the same, a
working mastery of civil procedure did not require clarity in distinguishing 12(b)(1)
and 12(b)(6) matters. That state of affairs has now changed, due to Iqbal’s alteration
of the requirements for adequate statement of a claim. The “showing” required by
Rule 8(a)(2) should now be judged by a different standard from the “statement” of
jurisdiction required by Rule 8(a)(1). Hence the distinction between jurisdictional
matters and matters of legal sufficiency has significant real-world implications.
It is hard to prevent courts from erring by treating identically these two threshold
requirements of the complaint, and harder to eradicate the error once it has appeared
in a circuit. Without attentive remedial work in the courts of appeal, Rule 12
jurisprudence faces the prospect of gradual further erosion of jurisdictional doctrine
and imprecision in civil procedure. The two trends reinforce each other, and only
the Supreme Court is in a position to halt the spiral.

247

Id.

248

Id.; see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992) (invalidating the
“citizen-suit” provision of the Endangered Species Act, because it violated the “case or
controversy” requirement of Article III) (quoting Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 309-10
(1944)); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 362-63 (1911) (reversing and remanding
with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, because in passing the law
enabling litigants to sue without standing “the Congress [had] exceeded the limitations of
legislative authority, so far as it required of this court action not judicial in its nature within
the meaning of the Constitution”).
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